



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**WESTERN RADICALIZATION: RETHINKING THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM**

by

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March 2017

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**WESTERN RADICALIZATION: RETHINKING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
TERRORISM**

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. strategy to counter violent extremism relies heavily on the expert consensus that terrorists are engaging in political “group speak” and are by nature psychologically “normal.” Thus, anyone is susceptible to radicalization. To counter radicalization, finding answers is like finding a needle in a haystack. However, in the psychologically similar phenomenon of arson by firefighter—when a firefighter deliberately sets and then extinguishes a fire to appear heroic—the needle was found in an objective detailed analysis of offenders. This thesis takes the known root causes of arson by firefighter and applies them to the unknown root causes of Westerner radicalization. The small percentage of firefighters who commit this type of arson do so to establish an identity and sense of belonging. Similarly, disconnected Westerners radicalize to pursue a narrative of belonging and significance. This thesis argues that while captured and former terrorists may appear “normal” and motivated by grievances, the reality may not be that simple; the human mind is not a light switch that flips evenly between normal and abnormal. The consensus view on countering violent extremism, which dismisses psychoanalytical or psychological approaches, must be reevaluated.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On June 12, 2016, Omar Mateen entered the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, and began shooting. During the attack, Mateen paused to call a local television station, make a call to 911, and pledge allegiance to ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) on social media. During the calls, he referred to himself as a *Mujahed*, an “Islamic soldier,” and claimed the attack was in response to a drone strike. Before being killed by officers hours later, he killed forty-nine people and injured fifty-three.

Intuitively, there seems something inextricably malignant—something readily identifiable—in a mass murderer of civilians who pauses from the carnage to check and post to a social media account. Mateen, like firefighter-turned-serial-arsonist John Orr, obsessed over significance conferred by others through praise and adulation. Eerily similar, Orr and Mateen were both rejected as police officers yet pretended otherwise. The two men experienced rejection from friends and family and were destined to lead lives of insignificance. Both acted on a malignant narrative that conferred significance at the expense of the lives of others. Both seemed willing to rationalize murder to be admired by others.

Still, the prevalent school of academic thought, which has informed professionals tasked with detecting radicalized persons, maintains that any individual is susceptible to radicalization. As Clark McCauley describes, “The psychology behind terrorist violence is normal psychology, abnormal only in the intensity of the group dynamics that link cause with comrades.”¹ Under this theory, terrorists are rational actors acting in support of a group and in response to a grievance. According to psychology Professor Fathali Moghaddam, we must maintain our opposition to terrorism but reposition our worldview to “better understand why terrorists behave the way they do.”² In other words, we as Westerners must avoid creating the many reasons why terrorists hate us. Although the West has sought to mitigate such perceived grievances by reducing the number of service

¹ Bruce Bongor et al., *Psychology of Terrorism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), 20.

² Fathali Moghaddam, *From the Terrorist's Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 2.

members in the lands of the historical caliphate and releasing prisoners from Guantanamo Bay, radicalization has increased.³

The consensus view on countering violent extremism, which dismisses psychoanalytical or psychological approaches, must be reevaluated. This view on the psychology of terrorism lacks the healthy skepticism employed within the study of narrative criminology. In other words, to understand the behavior, it is incredibly important to interview the offender and analyze his or her claimed reasoning, but not to conflate the offender's narrative with reality.⁴ For instance, John Orr described an idyllic childhood akin to *Ozzie and Harriet* even though his mother had abandoned him as a teenager.⁵ Anders Breivik, the right-wing terrorist who murdered seventy-seven and injured 319, claimed to be popular and outgoing when in reality he was a shy loner.⁶ Omar Mateen was obsessed with becoming a police officer and proudly displayed his New York Police Department t-shirts on social media, yet he was repeatedly rejected from law enforcement employment.⁷

This thesis attempted to take the known root causes of arson by firefighter—when a firefighter deliberately sets and then extinguishes a fire to appear heroic—and apply them to the unknown root causes of Westerner radicalization. Both firefighter arsonists and Westerner terrorists similarly radicalize in pursuit of fulfilling a narrative of belonging and significance—if only in the hereafter. To know and understand the Islamic State, the United States and its allies need to do more than simply interview captured adherents for their accounts; instead, they must closely analyze the individuals' actions and terrorist methodologies used to recruit and inspire Westerners.

³ Peter Bergin et al., "Terrorism in America after 9/11," *New America*, accessed March 13, 2017, <http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/analysis.html>.

⁴ Lois Pressor, "Criminology and the Narrative Turn," *Crime Media Culture* 12, no. 2 (2016): 137–151; Sveinung Sandberg, "Are Self-narratives Unified or Fragmented, Strategic or Determined? Reading Breivik's Manifesto in Light of Narrative Criminology," *Acta Sociologica* 56, no. 1 (2013): 69–83.

⁵ Joseph Wambaugh, *Firelover* (New York: Harper Collins, 2002).

⁶ Sandberg, "Self-narratives."

⁷ Skyler Swisher, "Omar Mateen Failed Multiple Times to Start Career in Law Enforcement, State Records Show," *Sun Sentinel*, June 16, 2016, <http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/florida/fl-omar-mateen-fdle-records-20160616-story.html>.

The real question in both phenomena is: What differentiates that tiny fraction who become firefighter arsonists or radicals from everyone else? Contrary to prior theory, this thesis finds that typical firefighter arsonists are not pyromaniacs or “arsonists turned firefighters.”⁸ Instead, the arson-by-firefighter epidemic was caused in large part by the hero complex.⁹ In other words, firefighter arsonists set fires to seek heroic status by being the first on scene or to save a life. Moreover, the research suggests they possess something more than the simple desire to appear heroic; instead, this drive serves as a mechanism to establish a social identity within a culturally admirable group.

Offender profiles developed by the FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit and separately by researchers from South Carolina provide significant clues to understanding what separates that small number of arsonist firefighters from every other young firefighter. Typically, the offenders studied had dysfunctional childhoods and unstable relationships as young adults, with the associated lack of social and interpersonal skills. They also possessed poor occupational histories, which often involved frequently changing menial, low-wage jobs. Many of the offenders experienced stressors such as isolation, alcoholism, depression, or other psychosocial disorders.¹⁰ Cumulatively, the profiles depict persons who were shunned by family and society. They were unable to conform to what society expected of them and sought to change their social identities—to reinvent themselves through heroic acts, even if manufactured. However, there exists something inherently malignant in these narratives; the offenders willingly risked the lives of others to portray themselves as selfless and heroic.

Within a distinct but nonetheless parallel narrative, terrorist leaders and recruiters provide a mechanism to establish meaning and significance to the insignificant. ISIS employed the Internet to cast an immensely wide net with a message targeted at the socially isolated, disaffected, and otherwise vulnerable few seeking meaning. This

⁸ Matt Hinds-Aldrich, “Firesetting Firefighters: Reconsidering a Persistent Problem,” *International Fire Service Journal of Leadership and Management* 5, no. 1 (2011): 33–46.

⁹ U.S. Fire Administration, *Special Report: Firefighter Arson* (USFA-TR-141) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2003), <https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-141.pdf>; Ken Cabe, “Firefighter Arson: Local Alarm,” *Fire Management Notes* 56, no. 1 (1996).

¹⁰ U.S. Fire Administration, *Firefighter Arson*.

strategy tailors efforts toward social misfits and outsiders who are not religious by providing a narrative that can establish a social identity.¹¹ In this regard, ISIS's recruitment strategy strives to answer the quest for significance if not in life, then in the hereafter.¹² It begins with a connection, followed by increasing attention and establishment of a relationship, followed by instilled importance and the opportunity to appear significant or heroic. Significant battlefield successes and the declaration of the caliphate legitimized the narrative, which seemingly corresponded with the sudden dramatic increase in recruitment and inspiration.

Training for analysts or officers whose job is to detect radicalized persons or those with a potential for violence should include familiarization with the characteristics found in arsonist firefighters as well as those targeted by ISIS. Similarly, training should incorporate research into the dark triad, the personality traits of narcissism, psychopathology, and Machiavellianism.¹³ While the existence of one or more of these characteristics alone is not dispositive, it is relevant. When these factors exist at a level that suggests mental illness, however—coupled with indications of embracing the ISIS narrative, such as the possession of beheading videos—it should be cause for great concern. It is critically important for those suspected of radicalization not to be categorized solely as either terrorists or mental health patients; they may, indeed, be both. Collaboration between mental health professionals and joint terrorism task forces should be considered.

¹¹ "Case by Case: ISIS Prosecutions in the United States," Center on National Security at Fordham Law, July 2016, 2–3, <http://www.centeronnationalsecurity.org/research/>.

¹² Mark Lilla, "The Politics of God," *New York Times Magazine*, August 19, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/magazine/19Religion-t.html>.

¹³ Delroy Paulhus, and Kevin Williams, "The Dark Triad of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and Psychopathy," *Journal of Research in Personality* 36, no. 6 (December 2002): 556–563.

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I. INTRODUCTION

For many years, some Westerners have inexplicably become radicalized to the point of violence. Some have participated in attacks or attempted attacks here in the United States or in Europe. Others who have become radicalized have traveled abroad to participate in *jihad* as foreign fighters. The West's inability to accurately predict or prevent radicalization results in two negative consequences. First, vast numbers of peaceful Muslims have been wrongly associated with violence; second, as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)–inspired attacks and bombings have established in the West, the homegrown threat has increased from within.

To date, seemingly all anti-radicalization efforts have met severe criticism or failure. However, the similarities between the phenomena of radicalization and arson by firefighter—when a firefighter deliberately sets and then extinguishes a fire to appear heroic—may suggest a pathway forward to prevent or counter radicalization. Ultimately, if the same or similar psychopathology or susceptibility exists in both phenomena, the successful efforts to deter one could reasonably be expected to work for the other. To explore effective detection and deterrence strategies, this thesis asks the following questions:

- Is there an identifiable correlation between the phenomena of arson by firefighter and radicalization, and, if so, can the lessons learned from the study of firefighter arsonists be applied to prevent radicalization of Westerners?
- How does the hero complex affect the radicalization of Westerners, and how might the experience of dealing with the hero complex in firefighters help U.S. officials identify, screen, and divert would-be radicals from within American society?

The goal of this thesis is to apply the study of arson by firefighter and its relationship to the hero complex to radicalization. Making sense of the radicalization of Westerners and contributing to the development of successful anti-radicalization efforts requires a better understanding of why similarly situated individuals sometimes radicalize but more often do not. In other words, this thesis asks: Is it possible to identify a

psychopathology of a person susceptible to radicalization? If such psychopathology—or innate susceptibility to radicalization—can be identified, prevention efforts can be targeted toward those persons. Necessarily, this question presupposes related questions: Is the current theory about radicalization—which suggests that radicals have no psychopathology and are simply using violence as political speech—accurate? Further, is there a correlation between the hero complex and those who are susceptible to radicalization?

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Since 9/11, it is estimated that more than 4,000 Westerners, including 200 to 300 Americans, have become radicalized and engaged in violent extremism.¹ On November 5, 2009, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan walked into a Fort Hood soldier readiness center shouting, “*Allahu Akbar!*” Within moments, Hasan shot and killed thirteen people and wounded thirty.² On April 15, 2013, two bombs detonated near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three and wounding 264.³ Three days later, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, radicalized brothers who had lived in the United States since 2002, were identified as the perpetrators.⁴ On May 3, 2015, two masked men attacked officers protecting a cartoon exhibit at the Curtis Culwell Center in Garland, Texas. The men,

¹ The term “Westerner” as used in this thesis refers to a person born and raised or a long-time occupant of North America or Western Europe; Homeland Security Committee Task Force, *Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel* (Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 2015); Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s,” Kings College London, January 26, 2015, <http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s>.

² Sig Christenson, “Chilling Testimony at Fort Hood Hearing,” *San Antonio Express News*, October 14, 2010, <http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Hasan-s-Fort-Hood-hearing-brings-chilling-1718518.php>.

³ Deborah Kotz, “Injury Toll from Marathon Bombs Reduced to 264,” *Boston Globe*, April 23, 2013, <http://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2013/04/23/number-injured-marathon-bombing-revised-downward/NRpaz5mmvGquP7KMA6XsIK/story.html>.

⁴ Snezana Farborav and Paul Thompson, “Younger Bomb Suspect DID Kill His Own Brother by Running Him over, Says Boston Police Chief,” *Daily Mail*, April 24, 2013, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2312643/Boston-bomb-suspect-Commissioner-Ed-Davis-says-Dzhokhar-Tsarnaev-killed-brother.html#ixzz4WjPHI58n>.

armed with assault rifles, were killed by officers and identified as American-born Elton and Nadir Soofi.⁵

On June 12, 2016, American-born Omar Mateen entered the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, armed with a rifle and a handgun. Before being killed three hours later, the 29-year-old pledged allegiance to ISIS, killing forty-nine people and wounding fifty-three.⁶ A few months later, on September 17, 2016, a series of powerful bombs detonated and several more were recovered in New Jersey and New York; ultimately, because the first device was identified and the area evacuated, only thirty-one people were injured by the bombing.⁷ Ahmad Khan Rahami, a 28-year-old American citizen native to Afghanistan, was charged with the attacks.⁸ In late 2016, 26-year-old Esteban Santiago-Ruiz, a New Jersey native and Iraq War veteran, left his newborn child and a firearm in his car and walked into a local FBI office to report his mind was being controlled by ISIS, causing “terroristic thoughts.”⁹ Weeks later, on January 6, 2017, Santiago recovered a weapon from his checked bags at the Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport baggage claim and shot and killed five and wounded another six people.¹⁰

Each of these homegrown violent extremists were inspired by ISIS or al Qaeda, and the perpetrators had been reported as suspicious to law enforcement prior to the

⁵ Catherine Shoichet, and Michael Pearson, “Garland, Texas, Shooting Suspect Linked Himself to ISIS in Tweets,” CNN, May 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/04/us/garland-mohammed-drawing-contest-shooting>.

⁶ Del Quinton Wilber, “The FBI Investigated the Orlando Mass Shooter for 10 Months—And Found Nothing. Here’s Why,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 14, 2016, <http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-fbi-investigation-mateen-20160712-snap-story.html>.

⁷ Zachary Fagenson, “5 People Dead, 8 Wounded in Shooting at Fort Lauderdale Airport; Suspect Had Gun in Checked Bag,” *Alaska Dispatch News*, January 7, 2017, <https://www.adn.com/nation-world/2017/01/06/9-people-reported-shot-1-dead-at-florida-airport/>.

⁸ Karen Workman, Eli Rosenberg, and Christopher Mele, “Chelsea Bombing: What We Know and Don’t Know,” *New York Times*, September 19, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/19/nyregion/chelsea-explosion-what-we-know-and-dont-know.html>.

⁹ Collin Dwyer, “What We Know about the Fort Lauderdale Shooting Suspect,” NPR, January 7, 2017, <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/07/508697034/what-we-know-about-the-fort-lauderdale-shooting-suspect>.

¹⁰ Sonam Sheth, “FBI: Fort Lauderdale Shooting Suspect Says He Carried out the Attack on Behalf of ISIS,” *Business Insider*, January 17, 2017, <http://www.businessinsider.com/fbi-fort-lauderdale-shooting-suspect-says-he-carried-out-the-attack-on-behalf-of-isis-2017-1>.

attacks. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in post-hoc analysis of the telltale signs of radicalization missed by professionals charged with the difficult job of protecting the United States from terrorism. Nonetheless, much of U.S. counterterrorism theory underemphasizes the radicalized individuals' motivations when seeking to detect and counter violent extremism.

The current U.S. strategy to counter violent extremism relies heavily on the expert consensus that terrorists are engaging in political “group speak” and are by nature psychologically “normal.” Thus, anyone is susceptible to radicalization. This consensus was largely formed after extensive interviews of captured and former terrorists. This thesis argues that while captured and former terrorists may appear “normal” and assert that they are motivated by grievances, the truth may not be so simple. The increased success of ISIS recruiting—coinciding with successes on the battlefield, the creation of the caliphate, and the targeting of susceptible people—supports this argument. Further, the experiences in Sri Lanka, and more recently with increased U.S. efforts against ISIS, suggest that grievances are over-valued when related to radicalization. Perhaps more significant than grievance is the innate human desire to join or support the perceived “winning” side in conflict and its overwhelming appeal to those susceptible to radicalization. Those who radicalize do so to satisfy a quest for significance.

When Western governments focus on mitigating grievances, they presuppose that individual radicalized Western terrorists are seeking some strategic goal when engaging in behavior almost certain to result in their deaths. As national security affairs professor Dr. Mohammed Hafez explains, “One should not conflate the goals of an organization with the motives of the individual. Moreover, while organizations deploying human bombs are, generally speaking, strategically-oriented, this is not the case for individual bombers.”¹¹ Instead, the radicalized Westerner, this thesis argues, acts in a manner very likely to result in his or her death in an individual quest to appear heroic or otherwise significant.

¹¹ Mohammed Hafez, “Dying to Be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide Terrorism,” in *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom*, ed. Amy Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2006), 55.

Over the last several years, U.S. and European strategies to counter violent extremism assume that Westerns radicalize due to grievances, including the appearance of a large, heavy-handed—and heavily armed—Western presence in the Muslim world.¹² Western Muslims are said to radicalize out of this grievance and the desire for “excitement, adventure, camaraderie and the chance to do something significant.”¹³ As part of this strategy, in Cairo in June 2009, President Obama promised “a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world.”¹⁴ As long as U.S. forces occupied Muslim-majority countries, however, no such new beginning was likely to occur. The United States and its European allies dramatically reduced the presence of service members in the Middle East to the point of essentially vacating Iraq in 2011.¹⁵ Meanwhile, Western governments have made significant overtures to mitigate grievances, including dramatically reducing the number of detainees at Guantanamo Bay.

Nevertheless, the rate of radicalization—persons radicalizing to the point of committing acts of violence or becoming foreign fighters—greatly increased in 2014 and 2015.¹⁶ Inspiration and recruitment dramatically increased with the ISIS declaration of the caliphate in June 2014. In fact, between mid-2014 and March 2015, the number of Islamic foreign fighters surged by 71 percent.¹⁷ In the years following 9/11, Islamic homegrown extremists were indicted or killed, on average, in the low- to mid-teens annually, with a peak of forty-five in 2009, then an average of 23 per year and a spike to

¹² Glen Greenwald, “The Same Motive for Anti-US ‘Terrorism’ Is Cited over and over,” *Guardian*, April 24, 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/apr/24/boston-terrorism-motives-us-violence>; “U.S. ‘War on Terror’ Has Increased Terrorism,” Global Research, October 22, 2013, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/u-s-war-on-terror-has-increased-terrorism/5355073>.

¹³ Julie Harbin, “Psychology of a Terrorist: Experts Go to the Source,” *ISLAMiCommentary*, November 6, 2014, <https://islamiccommentary.org/2014/11/psychology-of-a-terrorist-experts-go-to-the-source/>.

¹⁴ Jesse Lee, “The President’s Speech in Cairo: A New Beginning,” the White House, June 4, 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/06/04/presidentrsquos-speech-cairo-a-new-beginning>.

¹⁵ “Remarks by the President on Ending the War in Iraq,” the White House, October 21, 2011, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/21/remarks-president-ending-war-iraq>.

¹⁶ Justin Berger “Anatomy of the Terror Threat: Files Show Hundreds of U.S. Plots, Refugee Connection,” Fox News, June 22, 2016, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/06/22/anatomy-terror-threat-files-show-hundreds-us-plots-refugee-connection.html>.

¹⁷ “UN Says ‘25,000 Foreign Fighters’ Joined Islamist Militants,” BBC, April 2, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32156541>.

seventy-three in 2015.¹⁸ In the United States, there have been 580 terror-related convictions; between March 2014 and June 2016, more than 131 U.S. citizens have been implicated in acts of terror.¹⁹

There are more than 3.5 million Muslims in North America and more than 44 million Muslims in Europe.²⁰ The various radical Muslim groups have employed very aggressive recruitment schemes, yet only 200 to 300 Americans and Canadians and between 4,000 and 5,000 Europeans have actually radicalized to the point of extremism.²¹ In other words, the extremist groups have a recruitment success rate of 1 in 11,666 for North America and 1 in 11,000 for Europe. While recruitment success rates in the different regions are curiously similar, the staggering recruitment failure rate demonstrates there must be something more than “excitement, adventure, camaraderie and the chance to do something significant” that separates those who radicalize from those who do not. Nearly every young person living in the West, Muslim or otherwise, is looking for excitement or significance, but only a fraction radicalize to the point of violence. The current state of radicalization theory does not account for this discrepancy.²²

¹⁸ Bergin et al., “Terrorism in America.”

¹⁹ Berger, “Anatomy of the Terror Threat”; Michael Noonan and Phyl Khalil, “North American Foreign Fighters,” *Journal for Deradicalization* 1 (Winter 2014): 66–96, <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/6>.

²⁰ “The Future of the Global Muslim Population—Region: Americas,” Pew Research Center, January 27, 2011, <http://pewforum.org/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-americas.aspx>; “The Future of the Global Muslim Population—Region: Europe,” Pew Research Center, January 27, 2011, <http://pewforum.org/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-europe.aspx>.

²¹ J.M. Berger, “Tailored Online Interventions: The Islamic State’s Recruitment Strategy,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 23, 2015, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/tailored-online-interventions-the-islamic-states-recruitment-strategy>; Griff Witt and Steven Munson, “Suspect Arrested as Plot in France Is Foiled; Six Detained in Brussels Investigation,” *Washington Post*, March, 24, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/european-security-chief-warns-of-threat-from-a-community-of-5000-suspects/2016/03/24/71877cc4-f12e-11e5-a2a3-d4e9697917d1_story.html.

²² It is worth noting that research into network theory may help solve this puzzle. A study of German foreign fighters concluded they are “primarily mobilized through traditional social network connections and that the mobilizing network in Germany consists of a nationwide, interconnected, and politically active ‘Salafist scene.’” Sean C. Reynolds, “German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016).

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review provides a sampling of the voluminous literature attempting to address what Marc Sageman refers to as a simple but unanswered question: “What leads a person to political violence?”²³ In much the same way that terrorism has evolved in waves, so has the study of what makes a person become a terrorist. Very generally, radicalization is a process, pathway, or puzzle in which a person living in the West develops increasingly extreme or deviant social, political, or religious views. A radicalized person feels compelled to impose those views on others or punish those perceived as evil for their actions or disbelief.²⁴ Significantly, only a very small number of the world’s 1.6 billion Islamic adherents ever radicalize. Mohammed Hafez asserts that radical Islamism “entails an ideological commitment to establish an Islamic state ... and a strategic commitment to engage in violent mobilization.”²⁵ The focus of this thesis is Westerners who have radicalized to the point of actual or threatened violence.

Very generally, theories regarding the causes of radicalization have moved over time from psychology-based to ideology and grievance-based explanations, and then to societal theories, some of which combine all of these theories. The various theories fall within two general categories: bottom-up approaches, which look to characteristics of individual terrorists and groups of terrorists, and top-down approaches, which emphasize grievances that reveal the seeds of terrorism in relative disparity within political, social, and economic circumstances.²⁶ The theoretical categories, while not mutually exclusive, have seemed to evolve over time from bottom-up to top-down. This progression in theoretical consensus has coincided with an increased scholarly emphasis on interviews of current and former terrorists, but not necessarily Westerners who have been

²³ Marc Sageman, “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26 (2014): 565–580.

²⁴ Brian Michael Jenkins, “Outside Experts View,” in *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process*, eds. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman (Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense and Democracies, 2009).

²⁵ Mohammed M. Hafez, “Illegitimate Governance: The Roots of Islamist Radicalization in the MENA,” in *Governance in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Abbas Kadhim (New York: Routledge, 2012), 86.

²⁶ Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 1 (February 2005): 3–42.

radicalized.²⁷ There exists significant overlap and re-appropriation among theoretical models that are similar in description if not in name.

This review begins with an overview of research seeking to understand violence in its broadest sense: as human deviancy. It then defines political violence, terrorism, and radicalization. Finally, some scholars have begun to revive psychological theories by placing greater emphasis on the individual's quest for significance.

1. The Study of Criminology and Violent Deviance

Scholars have long sought to understand what causes two similar individuals to behave differently: one peacefully, the other violently. As in the study of radicalization, scholars studying the broader concept of deviant human behavior have shifted positions rather dramatically. The earliest explanations for violent behavior attributed it to demonic possession.²⁸ By the late nineteenth century, amid prevailing notions of social Darwinism and eugenics, Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso suggested a person is born "defective" and, as such, a "born criminal."²⁹ According to Lombroso, criminal defects include a sloping forehead, large jaw, and long arms. These defects suggest that criminals are the product of atavism, or savage throwbacks in evolution.³⁰

Subsequent theories of the causes of crime included concepts such as rationalism, free will, determinism, and more recently narrative criminology.³¹ Research psychologists Stanton Samenow and Samuel Yochelson conducted a fifteen-year study involving convicted male criminals at St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, DC, during which they extensively interviewed numerous convicted criminals. In *The Criminal Personality: A Profile for Change*, they note that, in all their interviews, not once did a

²⁷ Paul Gill, *Lone Actor Terrorists: A Behavioral Analysis* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Harbin, "Psychology of a Terrorist."

²⁸ James A. Inciardi and Kenneth C. Haas, *Historical Explanations of Crime: From Demons to Politics* (Dubuque, IA: Kendal/Hunt, 1978).

²⁹ Charles A. Ellwood, "Lombroso's Theory of Crime," *Journal of Law and Criminology* 2, no. 5 (1912).

³⁰ Nicole Rafter, "Rethinking Criminological Tradition: Cesare Lombroso and the Origins of Criminology," *ERCES Online Quarterly Review* 1, no. 1 (2004).

³¹ Inciardi and Haas, *Historical Explanations of Crime*.

criminal consider him or herself a criminal.³² These subjects identified and condemned criminality in others but considered “the very word *criminal* offensive when applied to them” (emphasis added).³³ These criminologists and others have found that criminals create frames or narratives to explain or rationalize their behavior. Seeking to understand the causes of crime, contemporary scholars have identified and studied the narratives offenders use to rationalize their conduct.³⁴ Critical to narrative criminology is the acceptance of the narrative as a story or tale associated with criminal conduct, as described by Lois Fletcher, “whatever their presumed accuracy or inaccuracy. We wonder about the impacts of stories; it matters little whether they are ‘true’ or ‘false.’”³⁵ Sveinung Sandberg, for instance, applied narrative criminology to the manifesto of terrorist Anders Behring Breivik.³⁶ Sandburg notes the many inaccuracies and distortions; “for example, Breivik presents himself as a popular and outgoing person, yet most who know him describe him as shy and lonely.”³⁷ Each evolution of the study of criminal or violent deviant behavior provides more information about why humans behave in unpredictable and often cruel ways.

2. The Bottom-Up Approach: Focus on the Individual

In the late 1890s and early 1900s, Sigmund Freud and his contemporaries, including Carl Jung and Alfred Adler, developed various approaches to understanding human behavior, collectively referred to as the “psychodynamic approach.”³⁸ Proponents of this approach theorized that humans are irrational and behavior is the product of the

³² Stanton Samenow and Samuel Yochelson, *The Criminal Personality: A Profile for Change* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 19–23.

³³ *Ibid.*, 24.

³⁴ Jack Katz, *Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil* (New York: Basic Books, 1988).

³⁵ Lois Pressor, “Criminology and the Narrative Turn,” *Crime Media Culture* 12, no. 2 (2016): 137–151.

³⁶ Sveinung Sandberg, “Are Self-narratives Unified or Fragmented, Strategic or Determined? Reading Breivik’s Manifesto in Light of Narrative Criminology,” *Acta Sociologica* 56, no. 1 (2013): 69–83.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 71.

³⁸ George Makari, *Revolution in Mind: The Creation of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008), 174–178, 253–260.

unconscious mind.³⁹ Freud viewed the mind like an iceberg, with the conscious mind visible and the much larger and powerful subconscious submerged.⁴⁰ However, according to psychology Professor Fathali Moghaddam, Freud placed the highest priority on group life and the significance of the group's influence on the individual.⁴¹ A charismatic leader guides the group, creating cohesion through an "illusion of love." Emotional love within a group, however, is always counterbalanced by hate toward those outside the group. Moghaddam describes Freud's message as follows: "We can all love one another, as long as there are some people left over to hate as outsiders."⁴² Consciously, we espouse the desire for peace; subconsciously, a myriad of perceived injustices fuel outsider hatred.

The psychodynamic approach applied to terrorism led to the work of political psychologist Jerrold M. Post, who divided terrorist groups into two categories both dealing with the same "internal split": "For the 'anarchic ideologues,' the split is within the psyche; for the 'nationalist secessionists,' the split is within their sense of national identity."⁴³ In both categories—anarchic ideologues and nationalist secessionists—the individual terrorist's only sense of significance is derived from being a terrorist.⁴⁴ Critics of the psychodynamic approach argue that little to no empirical research supports the conclusion of psychopathology as a cause of terrorism.⁴⁵ In 2003, John Horgan described

³⁹ Elke Mühlleitner and Johannes Reichmayr, "Following Freud in Vienna: The Psychological Wednesday Society and the Viennese Psychoanalytical Society 1902–1938," *International Forum of Psychoanalysis* 6, no. 2 (1997): 73–102, doi: 10.1080/08037069708405888.

⁴⁰ Laurence A. Pervin and Oliver P. John, *Personality: Theory and Research*, 7th edition (New York: Wiley, 1997).

⁴¹ Fathali Moghaddam, *From the Terrorist's Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006).

⁴² *Ibid.*, 17.

⁴³ Jerrold M. Post, "Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior," *Terrorism* 7, no. 2 (1984): 241–256, doi: 10.1080/10576108408435577.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ For instance, one researcher argued the theory based in part on tattoos discovered on a single terrorist. K.I. Pearce, "Police Negotiations," *Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal* 22, no. 4 (July 1977): 171–174.

the psychodynamic approach to understanding as the most popular but least scientific theory, as it relies on circular logic.⁴⁶

3. The Top-Down Approach: Relative Deprivation and Situationism

Relative deprivation is a theoretical foundation for much literature analyzing the causes of radicalization. During World War II, U.S. service members were surveyed regarding their circumstances within the war effort. The survey was intended to provide keys to understanding troop morale. Samuel Stouffer, the lead researcher, identified relative deprivation as the explanation for why individual responses did not appear objective, but relative to the group in which the service member lived and worked.⁴⁷ Specifically, Stouffer found that the morale of service members in units with objectively slow rates of promotion was generally positive. In contrast, in units with objectively faster rates of promotion (e.g., Air Force military police), service members more frequently coveted the promotions of their peers, and morale suffered. Research fellow Sophia Moskalenko has described the concept this way: “If everyone in your referent group owns a Ferrari, you will likely feel relatively deprived with ‘just’ a Mercedes. On the other hand, if people in your referent group are riding bikes to work or school, you’ll feel happy driving a Kia.”⁴⁸ Relative deprivation serves as the core concept for the larger body of behavior theory referred to as “social movement theory.” In social movement theory, feelings of deprivation are considered relative to the frame in which an individual or group sees itself as a catalyst for social change.⁴⁹ For instance, relative deprivation of money, power, or status may influence a group to seek change.

⁴⁶ John Horgan, “The Search for the Terrorist Personality,” in *Terrorists, Victims and Society*, ed. Andrew Silke, 1–27 (London: Wiley, 2003).

⁴⁷ Samuel A. Stouffer et al., “The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life,” in *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier*, volume 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), 125.

⁴⁸ Sophia Moskalenko, “One Man’s Ferrari Is Another Man’s Revolution,” *Psychology Today*, March 2011, <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/friction/201103/one-mans-ferrari-is-another-mans-revolution>.

⁴⁹ Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (August 2000): 611–639, doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611.

Situationists posit that individuals are either good or evil, depending on the situation. The nature–nurture debate was first broached in 1610 by William Shakespeare toward a particularly deviant villain in the *Tempest*, who was described as “a devil, a born devil, on whose nature Nurture can never stick.”⁵⁰ Walter Mischel, following the work of Burrhus Frederic Skinner, recast the nurture argument as situationism in 1968.⁵¹ Skinner tested extensively on animals, typically rats, to investigate if behavior is essentially the product of experience.⁵² Skinner influenced the behavior of the rats with positive or negative reinforcement. By applying these experiments to humans, Skinner theorized the creation of a utopia. Many scientists vilified Skinner, including Noam Chomsky, who asserted Skinner advocated mind control over humans based on experiments performed with animals.⁵³

A decade later, Philip Zimbardo, social psychologist and lead researcher of the Stanford Prison Experiment, doubled down on situationism. In the experiment, Stanford students were divided up to play the roles of jailors and the jailed. Zimbardo manipulated the jailors to produce sadistic behavior, leading to the early termination of the study. Zimbardo’s book, *The Lucifer Effect*, opens with an illustration from *Circle Limit IV* by M.C. Escher. The artwork, in the genre of tessellation, is an illusion of alternating white angels and black devils. Zimbardo’s interpretation of the illusion reveals what he considers “three psychological truths” of situationism:

First, the world is filled with both good and evil—was, is, will always be. Second, the barrier between good and evil is permeable and nebulous. And third, it is possible for angels to become devils and, perhaps more difficult more difficult to conceive, for devils to become angels.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ *The Tempest*, 3rd series, ed. Virginia Mason Vaughan and Alden T. Vaughan (New York: Arden Shakespeare, 1999).

⁵¹ Walter Mischel, *Personality and Assessment* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1968).

⁵² B.F. Skinner, *About Behaviorism* (New York: Vintage, 1976), chapter 1, section 3.

⁵³ Noam Chomsky, “The Case against B.F. Skinner,” *New York Review of Books* 17, no. 11 (December 1971).

⁵⁴ Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil* (New York: Random House, 2008), back cover.

The foundation of the metaphorical staircase to terrorism in Fathali Moghaddam's book *From the Terrorists' Point of View* is the confluence of situationism and relative deprivation. Moghaddam asserts that the ascent up his theoretical six-floor staircase can transform psychologically normal individuals into remorseless killers. At the ground floor, normal individuals are influenced by relative deprivation as a group. In other words, individuals within a particular group view themselves as being treated disparately relative to the broader community. These feelings of deprivation and the perceived lack of social justice motivate otherwise normal individuals to the next floor. Upon arriving at the second floor, individuals begin to seek a target to blame for the causes of the disparate treatment. As the sentiment builds toward aggression, individuals may rise to the next floor. At the fourth floor, they join or identify with a terrorist organization. Those reaching the fifth and sixth floors are ready to commit a terrorist act.⁵⁵

In contrast, Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins argue for moving away from an orderly "process" model and have proposed a "radicalization puzzle" to explain why seemingly normal people turn into potential terrorists. Their puzzle metaphor synthesizes "factors that come together to produce violent radicalization: personal and collective grievances, networks and interpersonal ties, political and religious ideologies, and enabling environments and support structures."⁵⁶ The puzzle metaphor seems far more apt than "process" to explain the perplexing phenomenon of a seemingly normal person becoming a violent radical.

4. Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory posits that the group to which an individual belongs influences his or her self-identity. Henri Tajfel argues individuals categorize the world around them within a construct of "us versus them."⁵⁷ Individuals observe a three-step

⁵⁵ Moghaddam, *Terrorists' Point of View*.

⁵⁶ Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, "The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 38 (2015): 958–975, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1051375.

⁵⁷ Henri Tajfel and John Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," in *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, eds. William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel, 33–47 (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1979), 47.

process: first they categorize the world around them; second, they adopt the social identity of the group to which they categorize themselves as belonging; and third, they compare their own group (the “in-group”) more favorably than others (“out-groups”).⁵⁸ The theory effectively explains the classic us-versus-them rivalry between crosstown high schools: though they are located only a few miles apart within the same town, their social identities foster feelings of animosity.

In 2000, Brannon, Esler, and Strindberg applied social identity theory to terrorism.⁵⁹ They argued that researchers’ biases and pejorative descriptions of violent terrorists have shaped much of terrorism study. Specifically, Brannon, Esler, and Strindberg argue, rather than approaching the subjects of their study with derision, they should be interviewed holistically in an attempt to identify the terrorist’s narrative. Failure to do so, they assert, locks both the researcher and the research subject into a “spiral of ignorance and suspicion.” Moreover, “social identity theory offers a framework for taking the step towards comprehending that revelation, an integrative setting for analytical models that are currently circumscribed by negative attitudinal predispositions.”⁶⁰ Some scholars, such as John Horgan, see social identity theory as a social and psychological “process” by which a person becomes radicalized.⁶¹ In this process, a psychologically normal person is pulled into a group over time through positive aspects of involvement in the group. Notably, however, some terrorism scholars differ from narrative criminology scholars; they believe in the truth of the narratives, while criminologists presume the narratives are largely false. As Paul Gill explains:

Research carried out on the IRA, Northern Ireland loyalists, Hezbollah, German terrorists, the FLN, ETA, Columbian Terrorists, global jihadists, and captured Palestinian terrorists has provided evidence that group based

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ David W. Brannan, Philip F. Esler, and N. T. Anders Strindberg, “Talking to ‘Terrorists’: Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 24, no. 1 (2001): 3–24.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Horgan, “Terrorist Personality”; John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 618, no. 1 (2008): 80–94; John Horgan, *Walking away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

terrorists are psychologically quite normal. ... In other words, an act of targeted violence is either the action of a rational terrorist or an irrational mentally unstable civilian. Over the space of 40 years of research on terrorist motivation the literature has jumped from one extreme position (“they are all mentally ill”) to the exact opposite (“by definition, a terrorist cannot be mentally ill”).⁶²

David Schanzer, director of the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, characterizes radicals as people who, in essence, are involved in a political movement. According to Schanzer, “It’s strange to say that a violent terrorist is involved in politics but it is a form of political communication in many ways and they want to talk because they want to promote their own ideas.”⁶³ As Horgan explains, “They’re motivated more by excitement, adventure, camaraderie, the chance to do something significant with their lives. But it doesn’t necessarily mean that they are radical in what they think.”⁶⁴ In other words, no matter how heinous a terrorist’s conduct, he or she is still psychologically normal and involved in political speech.

In sum, school of thought in the late 1990s and 2000s dismissed psychoanalytic or psychological approaches to understanding why people radicalize. As Clark McCauley describes, “The psychology behind terrorist violence is normal psychology, abnormal only in the intensity of the group dynamics that link cause with comrades.”⁶⁵ Nevertheless, McCauley’s assertion fails to acknowledge how violent videos, such as the ISIS immolation of a captured Jordanian pilot, can inspire a person of normal psychology to radicalize. Moreover, theorists who have rejected psychoanalytic approaches seem to ignore studies of lone-wolf terrorists—between 40 and 60 percent display signs of mental illness—and the mental health of radicalized Westerners altogether.⁶⁶ Further, one study including more than 9,000 participants concluded that approximately one-half of all

⁶² Gill, *Lone Actor Terrorists*.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Julie Harbin, “Psychology of a Terrorist.”

⁶⁵ Bonger et al., *Psychology of Terrorism*, 20.

⁶⁶ Ibid.; “The odds of a lone-actor terrorist having a mental illness are 13.49 times higher than the odds of a group actor having a mental illness”—Emily Corner, and Paul Gill, “A False Dichotomy? Mental Illness and Lone-Actor Terrorism,” *Law and Human Behavior* 39, no. 1 (2015): 23–34, doi: 10.1037/lhb0000102.

Americans will meet the criteria for a *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* diagnosis at some time in their lives, with typical onset in adolescence.⁶⁷

C. CONCLUSION AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

The study of what transforms a person into a terrorist has evolved in waves, much the same way that terrorism theory has evolved. The intent of this thesis is to demystify the motivations of the individual Westerner who has been radicalized to the point of violence. Why does the individual “need” to engage in political violence that will likely result in his or her death? To analyze the motivations of the individual, this thesis compares radicalization with the seemingly unrelated arson-by-firefighter phenomenon.

Today, firefighter arsonists are rare. However, much like the current radicalization of Westerners, the arson-by-firefighter problem in the late 1980s and early 1990s seemed an uncontrollable epidemic. Ironically, nearly every youth seeking to enter the fire service could be described under the radical recruit enticement for “excitement, adventure, camaraderie and the chance to do something significant.”⁶⁸ Analysis of perpetrators by the FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit and other organizations revealed that the arson-by-firefighter epidemic was caused in large part by the hero complex. In other words, firefighter arsonists were seeking heroism by being the first on scene to save lives endangered by the very fires they started. This led to the development of arson-by-firefighter profiles and, ultimately, much more successful screening and prevention programs.

Chapter II examines the quest for significance, the hero complex, and the relationship of the two phenomena with narcissism. Chapter III connects the phenomenon of arson by firefighter to the hero complex. Chapter IV analyzes Westerner radicalization from the perspective of ISIS operatives, examining what *they* think motivates an individual to radicalize. Chapter V seeks to demystify the motivations of Westerners who have radicalized to the point of violence.

⁶⁷ Ronald C. Kessler et al., “Lifetime Prevalence and Age-of-Onset Distributions of *DSM-IV* Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication,” *Arch Gen Psychiatry* 62, no. 6 (June 2005): 593–602.

⁶⁸ Harbin, “Psychology of a Terrorist.”

II. THE QUEST FOR SIGNIFICANCE, THE HERO COMPLEX, AND NARCISSISM

Some scholars have suggested it was a mistake to jettison the individual in search for root causes of radicalization. They have returned to psychology to explain why only a few individuals radicalize to the point of violence although many are subject to grievances, group dynamics, and networked social movements. Arie Kruglanski et al. reassert the bottom-up approach to explain the individual through self-love and the quest for significance as they relate to radicalization.⁶⁹

A. THE QUEST FOR SIGNIFICANCE

The quest for significance awakens, Kruglanski et al. argue, in response to one of three events: significance lost, the threat of significance lost, or the opportunity for significance gained.⁷⁰ Separately, Kruglanski et al. argue that three N's are required for radicalization: need (individual), network (social), and narrative.⁷¹ The need component is the quest for individual significance, particularly in the eyes of others. The network and narrative components include a social network validating the ideological narrative that justifies violence as an appropriate cure for perceived deprivation. In the context of suicide terrorism, value in the form of significance is conferred to a person living an otherwise unimportant life with low self-esteem and limited self-love.⁷²

Nearly 300 years ago, Jean-Jacques Rousseau articulated divided notions of love of self and self-love as the driving forces behind human behavior. Love of self (*amour de soi meme*) concerns the value of self-preservation, security, and survival. Love of self is what motivates an individual to seek shelter and food or to flee in the face of danger.

⁶⁹ Arie W. Kruglanski et al. "Terrorism—A (Self) Love Story: Redirecting the Significance Quest Can End Violence," *American Psychologist* 68, no. 7 (October 2013): 559–575, doi: 10.1037/a0032615.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Arie Kruglanski, "Psychology Expert: Why Extremists Use Violence in Their Quest for Significance," *Radicalization Research*, September 26, 2016, <http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/kruglanski-2016-psychology/>.

⁷² Martha Crenshaw, "Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay," *Security Studies* 16, no. 21 (2007).

Love of self as a sentiment occurs regardless of the views or concerns of others. Rousseau's self-love (*amour propre*) concerns the value or status conferred by others. Researcher Frederick Neuhouser characterizes self-love as the "passionate need to ... be someone" in the eyes of others, particularly in the eyes of those we believe possess value.⁷³

The intersection of these two divided notions of love manifests in an individual's behavior. In other words, different individuals will behave differently in response to identical scenarios depending on the relative strength of each notion. For instance, while the band on the deck of the Titanic, locked in the solidarity of self-love, continued to play as the ship went down, the ship's builder, consumed with love of self, sacrificed others to save himself.⁷⁴ The members of the band, each unwilling to appear weak in the eyes of the other members, suppressed self-preservation. The Titanic's builder, obsessed in the moment with love of self, or self-preservation, cared little about how he appeared in the eyes of others; he just needed to survive.

Every human seeks to be relevant. Relevance, however—the object of self-love—is defined by the group to which we belong or inspire to belong. In one regard, "It is the attainment of which culture says is worth attaining."⁷⁵ Or, perhaps more precisely, it is what *culture*, analyzed within Henri Tajfel's in-group and out-group framework, dictates is worth attaining.

B. THE HERO COMPLEX

Seeking to understand human behavior, psychologists Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung pioneered the field of psychoanalysis. They believed that much of human behavior is controlled by the unconscious mind. Jung employed symbolism and metaphor to explain why people behave in particular ways. When questioned about his use of

⁷³ Frederick Neuhouser, *Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-love: Evil, Rationality, and the Drive for Recognition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 31.

⁷⁴ Frances Wilson, "J. Bruce Ismay: Doomed the Moment He Jumped Ship, *Telegraph*, August 3, 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/8677437/Titanic-builder-J-Bruce-Ismay-doomed-the-moment-he-jumped-ship.html>.

⁷⁵ Kruglanski et al., "A (Self) Love Story."

metaphors, Jung rejected literal interpretation by invoking Goethe's *Faust*. "Symbols," he explained, "are nothing but humble attempts to formulate, to define, to shape the inexpressible. 'Wo fass ich Dich, unendliche Natur [Where can I grasp you, infinite nature]?'"⁷⁶ Unfortunately, without balance from the literal perspective, Jung's work was deemed nonscientific.

Jung attempted to communicate the ineffability of the human mind not only through symbolism and metaphor but also through what he described as a series of "complexes." These complexes consist of emotionally driven themes from a person's life that influence behavior, and were central to Jung's theories of analytical psychology. Freud, an associate of Jung, argued that the causes of criminality were intertwined with the Oedipus complex, or one's subconscious sexual desires.⁷⁷ Today, most people are familiar with the inferiority complex, advocated by Jung's colleague Alfred Adler, which suggests people who feel inferior to others overcompensate.⁷⁸ Contemporary scholar Lois Tyson describes the unconscious mind as "the storehouse of those painful experiences and emotions, those wounds, fears, guilty desires, and unresolved conflicts we don't want to know about because we feel we would be overwhelmed by them."⁷⁹ Jung theorized that a complex served as the bundle of unconscious feelings or themes that explained seemingly puzzling behavior.⁸⁰ These feelings or beliefs could be detected indirectly by word-association tests, wherein Jung presented a series of words to a subject to elicit the first related words that came to mind.⁸¹

⁷⁶ Gerhard Adler, *Letters of C.G. Jung, Volume 2, 1951–1961* (London: Routledge, 1976), 290; Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust: A Tragedy* (London: Grubb and Co., 1853), 337; Steven Walker, *Jung and the Jungians on Myth* (London: Routledge, 2002).

⁷⁷ Allen Brizee, J. Case Thompkins, Libby Chernouski, and Elizabeth Boyle, "Psychoanalytic Criticism (1930s to Present)," Purdue Online Writing Lab, June 3, 2013, <https://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/722/04/>.

⁷⁸ Gregory Mitchell, "Alfred Adler and Adlerian Individual Psychology," Mind Development, accessed March 14, 2017, <http://www.mind-development.eu/adler.html>.

⁷⁹ Lois Tyson, *Critical Theory Today: A User Friendly Guide* (New York: Garland, 1999), 15.

⁸⁰ "About Complexes," *Analytical Psychology and Psychoanalysis*, January 28, 2011, <https://analyticalpsychology.wordpress.com/tag/jung/>.

⁸¹ Carl G. Jung, "The Association Method," *American Journal of Psychology* 31 (1910): 219–2699.

While many within the academic establishment have discounted Jung's work, it has been extremely influential to modern psychology and personality theory. The American Psychological Association ranks Carl Jung as the twenty-third most eminent psychologist of the twentieth century.⁸²

Arguably, Jung's most famous contribution to psychology is the hero complex, also referred to as the hero archetype: the depiction of the quintessential romantic hero. This ideal hero, according to Jung, is one who conquers fear (represented by the dragon); one who enters the arena to face the dragon and lives to tell the tale.⁸³ Only a person who has entered the arena possesses the right to self-confidence and the camaraderie of other heroes.

C. THE TRAIT OF NARCISSISM

An unstated bond between these two theoretical concepts, the hero complex and the quest for significance, is an individual's ability to regulate his or her self-esteem. Thus, what differentiates the innate and positive (or at least benign) human desire to be relevant from malignant desires resides in the fragility of an individual's self-esteem. In other words, the difference resides in what an individual *needs* to do to be viewed as heroic or significant in the eyes of others. For a narcissist, self-love and, similarly, the need to be heroic, may rise to the level of obsession.

A person suffering from narcissistic personality disorder displays a sense of superiority and an inability to regulate self-esteem. Narcissists excessively seek affirmation and special attention from others. Since their self-esteem is dependent on others, they often engage attention-seeking strategies such as social competitiveness.

⁸² Steven J. Haggbloom et al., "The 100 Most Eminent Psychologists of the 20th Century," *Review of General Psychology* 6, no. 2 (June 2002): 139–152, doi: 10.1037/1089-2680.6.2.139.

⁸³ "It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat." Theodore Roosevelt, "Citizenship in a Republic," Sorbonne, Paris, France, April 23, 1910.

They typically lack empathy and, despite excessive attention seeking, have few intimate relationships.⁸⁴ Typically, narcissists are incorrectly perceived to possess inflated self-esteem or “defensive high self-esteem.”⁸⁵ As characterized by Leon Seltzer, “There is a vast difference between strong egos—and big ones.”⁸⁶ Recent research indicates that while a correlation between self-esteem and narcissism exists in the views of self, the two are qualitatively different.⁸⁷ If an individual with high self-esteem does not view himself as superior, he is not a narcissist. This distinction is significant in the origins of the two traits—narcissism as parental overvaluation, versus self-esteem as parental warmth.⁸⁸ As Eddie Brummelman et al. explain, “Experiences of overvaluation may lead to the core belief underlying narcissism: ‘I am superior to others.’ Experiences of warmth may lead to the core belief underlying self-esteem: ‘I am worthy.’”⁸⁹ Narcissists crave validation from others; they behave as though they are superior because their self-esteem, and thus superiority, is precarious.

Seltzer summarizes the six signs of narcissists as follows:

1. Are highly reactive to criticism;
2. Have low self-esteem;
3. Can be inordinately self-righteous and defensive;
4. React to contrary viewpoints with anger or rage;
5. Project onto others qualities, traits, and behaviors they can’t—or won’t—accept in themselves; and

⁸⁴ American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5)* (Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association, 2012).

⁸⁵ Eddie Brummelman, Sander Thomaes, and Constantine Sedikides, “Separating Narcissism from Self-Esteem,” *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 25, no. 1 (February 2016): 8–13, doi: 10.1177/0963721415619737.

⁸⁶ Leon F. Seltzer, “Our Egos: Do They Need Strengthening—or Shrinking?” *Psychology Today*, September 21, 2008, <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/evolution-the-self/200809/our-egos-do-they-need-strengthening-or-shrinking>.

⁸⁷ Brummelman, Thomaes, and Sedikides, “Separating Narcissism from Self-Esteem.”

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

6. Have poor interpersonal boundaries.⁹⁰

Not all persons possess the traits of narcissism at the same level. Subclinical narcissism, as opposed to clinical narcissism, appears in otherwise normal individuals, but to a lesser degree.⁹¹ Hereafter, subclinical and clinical narcissists are both referred to as narcissists.

Research increasingly validates that the millennial generation, those born between 1982 and 2004, is significantly more narcissistic than prior generations.⁹² In one study, 66 percent of millennial college students expressed that their professors should grant them special consideration because they “tried hard,” relating back to experiences of overvaluation.⁹³ This generation of Westerners, which is most likely to become radicalized, suffers from a profound sense of entitlement and exaggerated sense of self-importance.⁹⁴ Increasingly, research has supported the belief that personality traits effectively predict behavior, objective life satisfaction, and consequential life outcomes.⁹⁵ Research also suggests personality traits may vary with socio-economic changes in a person’s life.⁹⁶ Millennial narcissists use social media at rates similar to other millennials, but with different strategies; most notably, narcissists post self-focused

⁹⁰ Leon F. Seltzer, “6 Signs of Narcissism You May Not Know about,” *Psychology Today*, November, 7, 2013, <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/evolution-the-self/201311/6-signs-narcissism-you-may-not-know-about/>.

⁹¹ Frederick Rhodewalt and Carolyn C. Morf, “Self and Interpersonal Correlates of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory: A Review and New Findings,” *Journal of Research in Personality* 29 (March 1995): 1–23, doi: 10.1006/jrpe.1995.1001.

⁹² Bruce Horowitz, “After GenX, Millennials, What Should the Next Generation Be?” *USAToday*, May 3, 2012, <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/advertising/story/2012-05-03/naming-the-next-generation/54737518/1>; Jean M. Twenge et al., “Egos Inflating over Time: A Cross-temporal Meta-analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory,” *Journal of Personality* 76, no. 4 (August 2008): 876–901; Jean M. Twenge et al., “Further Evidence of an Increase in Narcissism among College Students,” *Journal of Personality* 76, no. 4 (August, 2005): 919–928.

⁹³ Ellen Greenberger et al., “Self-entitled College Students: Contributions of Personality, Parenting, and Motivational Factors,” *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 37 (2008): 1193–1204, doi: 10.1007/s10964-008-9284-9.

⁹⁴ Raina Kelley, “Generation Me,” *Newsweek*, April 17, 2009, <http://www.newsweek.com/2009/04/17/generation-me.html>.

⁹⁵ Alex M. Wood, Stephen Joseph, and John Maltby, “Gratitude Predicts Psychological Well-Being above the Big Five Facets,” *Personality and Individual Differences* 46, no. 4. (March 2009): 443–447; Daniel Ozer and Verónica Benet-Martínez, “Personality and the Prediction of Consequential Outcomes,” *Annual Review of Psychology* 57 (January 2006): 401–421, doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190127.

⁹⁶ Christopher Boyce, Alex Wood, and Nattavuth Powdthavee, “Is Personality Fixed? Personality Changes as Much as ‘Variable’ Economic Factors and More Strongly Predicts Changes to Life Satisfaction,” *Social Indicators Research*, 111, no. 1 (March 2012).

photographs, or “selfies.”⁹⁷ Being rejected, invisible, or humiliated is every narcissist’s nightmare; taking a “selfie” permits the narcissist to combat his or her fear of invisibility. When a narcissist posts photographs of others on social media, it is typically only as a means for self-aggrandizement.⁹⁸

D. THE DARK TRIAD

Conceptually established in 2002 by Paulhus and Williams, the dark triad combines the distinct but related personality traits of subclinical narcissism, psychopathology, and Machiavellianism.⁹⁹ According to Mariani, “psychopathology is characterized by high impulsivity and low empathy ... and Machiavellianism is characterized by manipulative or exploitive behavior.”¹⁰⁰ The dark triad provides a new and significant “way to understand the ‘evil’ in the larger everyday population.”¹⁰¹ In a first-of-its-kind study, Fox and Rooney identified a correlation among the dark triad, the time men spend on social media, and the number and nature of selfies they post.¹⁰² The presence of dark triad traits indicated increased time spent on social media as well as increased numbers of selfies. The social media platforms, Fox and Rooney concluded, allowed the posters to manipulate how others viewed them.¹⁰³ The scholars theorize that persons with dark triad traits receive gratification by manipulating their online presence, concealing negative attributes, and falsely displaying positive attributes such as empathy.

⁹⁷ Shawn Bergman et al., “Millennials, Narcissism, and Social Networking: What Narcissists Do on Social Networking Sites and Why,” *Personality and Individual Differences*, 50, no. 5 (April 2011): 706–711, doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2010.12.022.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Delroy Paulhus, and Kevin Williams, “The Dark Triad of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and Psychopathy,” *Journal of Research in Personality* 36, no. 6 (December 2002): 556–563.

¹⁰⁰ Mike Mariani, “The Anti-social Network,” *Psychology Today*, September 5, 2016, <https://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/201609/the-anti-social-network>.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Jesse Fox and Margaret Rooney, “The Dark Triad and Trait Self-objectification as Predictors of Men’s Use and Self-presentation Behaviors on Social Networking Sites,” *Personality and Individual Differences* 76 (April 2015): 161–165.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

Gratification, and thus significance, in the eyes of others—à la Rousseau’s self-love—is conferred by the frequent approval and immediate validation from the online audience.¹⁰⁴

E. CONCLUSION

The conceptually similar concepts of the quest for significance and the hero complex quantify the innately human desire to be relevant in the eyes of others. Ultimately being relevant is important, but at what price? A particularly strong sense of self-love, relative to love of self, may result in the quest for significance in the eyes of others. Similarly, through the lens of Jung’s hero complex, the individual seeks camaraderie and belonging through perceived heroism. Either concept may become malignant when combined with personality traits of narcissism, psychopathology, and Machiavellianism.

¹⁰⁴ Mariani, “Anti-social Network.”

III. ARSON BY FIREFIGHTER AND THE HERO COMPLEX

Humans have been setting fires for various purposes for thousands of years. Some of the earliest practical purposes for fire-setting included prehistoric “fire stick farming” to drive animals or refreshing nutrients into the soil.¹⁰⁵ Fire-setting for nefarious purposes, known as arson, existed before recorded history as well. Soon after people began setting fires, others were tasked with fighting fires.¹⁰⁶ Paradoxically, some firefighters have been discovered to also be the fire-setters. Researchers have attempted to understand the causes underlying fire-setting and, more specifically, arson by firefighter. This chapter explores the correlation between arson by firefighter and Jung’s hero complex. It also examines the profile for an arsonist firefighter and its appropriate use and misuse.

In examining the phenomenon of arson by firefighter, the preliminary areas of concern are determining what constitutes being a “firefighter,” and how pervasive the firefighter-arsonist problem truly is. Given the emotionally charged reality that a firefighter arsonist has disgraced one’s profession, it is somewhat understandable to hear the distinction made between volunteer and “professional” firefighters in these cases. As stated in the U.S. Fire Administration’s *Special Report: Firefighter Arson* issued in 2003, “With over one million volunteer and paid firefighters, the number of those who cause fires represents only a fraction of the number who otherwise served honorably.”¹⁰⁷ When the problem does occur, however, it is a significant one: for example, John Orr, a serial firefighter arsonist, is believed to have single-handedly set 2,000 fires.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ R. Bliege Bird et al., “The ‘Fire Stick Farming’ Hypothesis: Australian Aboriginal Foraging Strategies, Biodiversity, and Anthropogenic Fire Mosaics,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 105, no. 39 (2008): 14796–14801.

¹⁰⁶ “Ancient Roman Firefighting,” Denver Firefighters Museum, December 19, 2013, <https://denverfirefightersmuseum.blogspot.com/2013/12/ancient-roman-firefighting.html>.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Evan Thomas, “Arson, The Scorched Earth Obsession,” *Newsweek*, November 27, 2007, <http://www.newsweek.com/arson-scorched-earth-obsession-103053>.

A. ARSONIST PROFILE

Arson is generally defined as intentionally and willfully setting fire to the property of another with the intent to cause damage.¹⁰⁹ According to FBI Uniform Crime Reporting statistics for 2011, 18.2 per 1,000 inhabitants committed arson, totaling at least 52,000 arsons that year.¹¹⁰ Data from the United State Fires Administration's National Fire Incident Reporting System indicate that approximately 210,300 fires, comprising 13 percent of all fires, are intentionally set every year in the United States.¹¹¹ These fires result in approximately 375 deaths and more than one billion dollars in property damage yearly.¹¹²

Given the seriousness of the damage inflicted by intentional fires, numerous studies have sought to understand arsonists' motivations.¹¹³ An early piece of literature discussing the phenomenon proclaimed, "The same reason that prompts a man to join a volunteer fire department sometimes leads him to set fires. [I am,] therefore, a strong adherent of the paid fire department."¹¹⁴ Regardless of whether the firefighter is a professional or a volunteer, the motive is of significant consequence. One of the earliest and most extensive fire-setter studies was published in 1951 by Lewis and Yarnell.¹¹⁵ The study analyzed approximately 2,000 case files provided by the U.S. National Board of Fire Underwriters. The analysis classified fire-setters within the following primary subgroups: psychotic persons, persons seeking vengeance, and those who set fires to conceal the commission of a burglary. Finally, the study grouped the seemingly

¹⁰⁹ *Black's Law Dictionary*, 9th Edition, s.v. "Arson," (Eagan, MN: West, 2009); Penalties, 18 U.S.C. § 844; Arson, California Penal Code § 451 (1872).

¹¹⁰ "Arson," FBI, September 2012, <https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/property-crime/arson>.

¹¹¹ FEMA, "Intentionally Set Fires," *Topical Fire Report Series* 9, no. 5 (November 2009), <https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/statistics/v9i5.pdf>.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Matthew Willis, *Bushfire Arson: A Review of the Literature* (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2004), http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/rpp/61/rpp061.pdf.

¹¹⁴ Matt Hinds-Aldrich, "Defining the Firefighter Arson Problem," *Fire and Safety Studies Blog*, 2011, <https://fireandsafetystudies.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/hinds-aldrich-defining-the-firefighter-arson-problem-research-note.pdf>.

¹¹⁵ Nolan D. C. Lewis and Helen Yarnell, *Pathological Firesetting* (New York: Coolidge Foundation, 1991).

motiveless remaining offenders as pyromaniacs, tramps, would-be heroes, volunteer firemen, and individuals with no apparent reasoning.¹¹⁶ Lewis and Yarnell described “would-be-hero” arsonists as “men with grandiose social ambitions whose natural equipment dooms them to insignificance.”¹¹⁷

In 1987, Icove and Estepp published the first computer-assisted motive-based fire-setter and fire-related crime analysis in conjunction with the FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit.¹¹⁸ The study sought to identify a motive—defined as an inner drive, impulse, reason, or incentive—that caused the crime, with the goal of developing an offender profile. Generally, the study concluded the motivations were as follows: 49 percent of arson incidents were perpetrated out of vandalism, 25 percent for “excitement,” 14 percent revenge, 2 percent crime concealment, 1 percent monetary gain, and 8 percent out of undetermined motives. A significant number of the vandals were juveniles. The 25 percent categorized under excitement included thrill seekers, attention seekers, firefighters wanting action, sexual perverts, pyromaniacs, and heroic firefighters. Pyrophilia, which causes a person to derive sexual satisfaction from starting a fire, warrants further study.¹¹⁹

While limited comprehensive statistics exist, it is certain that some percentage of the 210,300 intentional fires set each year are done so by firefighters. There is no national database targeting firefighter arson. However, a report by the National Volunteer Fire Counsel (NVFC) suggested that “over 100 firefighters a year are arrested for arson.”¹²⁰ The report’s lead author, Matt Hinds-Aldrich, compiled an original archival dataset of 1,213 arrested firefighters.¹²¹

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ David Icove and Jim Estepp, “Motive Based Offender Profiles of Arson and Fire-Related Crimes,” *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, April 1987.

¹¹⁹ Jerrod Brown et al., “Pyrophilia: A Need for Further Discussion,” *Behavioral Health* 2, no. 2 (2015): 2331–7582.

¹²⁰ National Volunteer Fire Council, *Report on the Firefighter Arson Problem: Context, Considerations, and Best Practices* (Greenbelt, MD: National Volunteer Fire Council, 2011), http://www.nvfc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/FF_Arson_Report_FINAL.pdf.

¹²¹ Hinds-Aldrich, “Firesetting.”

The FBI's Behavioral Science Unit and the South Carolina Forestry Commission both separately studied the phenomenon of arson by firefighter in the mid-1990s. The studies reveal a correlation between these fire-setters and a quest to appear heroic. However, other motives completely irrelevant to the individual's status as a firefighter also exist, including "excitement-motivated arson, vandalism-motivated arson, revenge-motivated arson, crime concealment-motivated arson, profit-motivated arson, and extremist" or terrorist-motivated arson.¹²² For example, Ernest Earl Ellison owned a water tender truck that was leased to the U.S. Forest Service to fight fires. His only real income existed when the forests were on fire. Ellison was convicted and sentenced to prison for a string of for-profit fires he set in Northern California in 1992 and 1993.¹²³

The study published in 1994 by Tim Huff of the FBI Behavioral Science Unit focused on seventy-five offenders identified as responsible for 182 fires comprising twenty-five solved cases.¹²⁴ In approximately two-thirds (64 percent) of the cases, the offender worked alone. The others involved multiple offenders from the same department. The offenders were young males, overall averaging 23 years of age. The average offender age for cases involving multiple offenders was 19 years of age. The offenders had poor work histories with multiple employers and the predominate motive was to appear heroic to peers or the community. The South Carolina Forestry Commission study—a separate study that relied on similar data points—was first published in 1994 by Ken Cabe. Though based on limited details, it contains similar results as the FBI study. The offenders typically had less than two years' experience and were associated with a department with few calls.¹²⁵ A slightly larger percentage of the cases involved multiple offenders.

¹²² U.S. Fire Administration, *Special Report: Firefighter Arson* (USFA-TR-141) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2003), <https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-141.pdf>.

¹²³ Richard Cole, "Arson for Profit Is Catching Fire in the Nation's Forests," *Los Angeles Times*, September 24, 1995.

¹²⁴ Timothy G. Huff, "Fire-Setting Fire Fighters: Identifying and Preventing Arsonists in Fire Departments," *IAFC On Scene* 8, no. 15 (August 1994). 6–7.

¹²⁵ Ken Cabe, "Firefighter Arson: Local Alarm," *Fire Management Notes* 56, no. 1 (1996).

These offender studies and the correlation of the hero quest were used to develop an arsonist firefighter profile and, ultimately, prevention programs. In 2003, the two profiles were presented in a special report published by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The elements, listed side-by-side in Table 1, while not identical, are quite similar.

Table 1. Side-by-Side Comparison of Firefighter Arsonist Profiles¹²⁶

| Trait | South Carolina Forestry Commission | FBI's Behavioral Science Unit |
|------------------------------|--|--|
| Demographics | White male, age 17–26 | White male, age 17–25 |
| Upbringing | Product of disruptive, harsh, or unstable rearing environment. | One or both parents missing from home during childhood. If from an intact home, the emotional atmosphere was mixed and unstable. |
| Parental Relationship | Poor relationship with father, overprotective mother. | Dysfunctional. One parent left the home before the child reached age 17. Cold, distant, hostile, or aggressive relationship with father. |
| Marital Status | If married, poor marital adjustment. | Poor marital adjustment. If not married, still living at home with parents. |
| Social Skills | Lacking in social and interpersonal skills. | No stable interpersonal relationship. |
| Occupation | Poor occupational adjustment, employed in low-paying jobs. | Poor occupational adjustment. Menial laborer, skilled laborer, clerical jobs. |
| Fire Service Interest | Fascinated with the fire service and its trappings. | Interested in fire service for its excitement, not for the sake of public service. |
| Social Stressors | Facing unusual stress (family, financial, or legal problems). | Alcoholism, childhood hyperactivity, homosexuality, depression, borderline personality disorder, suicidal tendencies. |
| Intelligence | Average to above-average intelligence but poor to fair academic performance. | Mixed findings, but most found to have average to higher intelligence. Poor academic performance. |

¹²⁶ Adapted from U.S. Fire Administration, *Firefighter Arson*.

The Behavioral Analysis Unit's profile indicated "the number one motive was excitement, especially among young firefighters who were eager to put their training to practical use, and to be seen as heroes to fellow firefighters and the community they served."¹²⁷

The U.S. Fire Administration's *Special Report: Firefighter Arson*, published in 2003, sums up the research into known firefighter arsonists as follows:

It was apparent that one of the primary motives for firefighters who commit arson is to be seen a hero. They may be the first to call in a fire, the first on the scene, and one of the most eager, excited, and enthusiastic members of the response team. Their main reason for lighting the fire is so they can appear as a hero, either by being the first to spot the flames, or by rescuing people and saving property.¹²⁸

Similar to the arsonist firefighters described in the FBI and South Carolina studies, Jung's hero craves to appear heroic. Jung writes,

In myths the hero is the one who conquers the dragon, not the one who is devoured by it. And yet both have to deal with the same dragon. Also, he is no hero who never met the dragon, or who, if he once saw it, declared afterward that he saw nothing. Equally, only one who has risked the fight with the dragon and is not overcome by it wins the hoard, the "treasure hard to attain." He alone has a genuine claim to self-confidence, for he has faced the dark ground of his self and thereby has gained himself. ... He has acquired the right to believe that he will be able to overcome all future threats by the same means.¹²⁹

Proving oneself worthy of the fire service fraternity fits this well. Moreover, the image of the dragon is striking. The hero battles the fire-breathing dragon, yet ironically, in the case of a firefighter arsonist, it is the dragon that sets the fire with the intention of becoming a hero. Heroics are not admirable if they compel the hero to create the crisis. Perhaps Jung was referring to this paradox when he wrote "the hero myth is an unconscious drama scene only in projection. ... The hero himself appears as a being of more than human stature. He is distinguished from the very being by his godlike

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 2.

¹²⁹ C.G. Jung, "Mysterium Coniunctionis," in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, eds. Gerhard Adler and R. F. C. Hull (New York: Bollingen, 1963), par. 756.

characteristics.”¹³⁰ Nevertheless, in the projection and, thus, in the manufactured social identity, the firefighter is godlike, be he a malevolent or benevolent god. The firefighter who engages in fire-setting is a destructive force.

The research argues that typical firefighter arsonists are not pyromaniacs or “arsonists turned firefighters.”¹³¹ Moreover, the research suggests they possess something more than the simple desire to appear heroic; instead, this drive serves as a mechanism to establish a social identity within a culturally admirable group.

In Western culture, firefighters are admired because they bravely risk their lives to save people and property. To a person living a life of familial or societal rejection, this admiration and popularity offers significance. However, not everyone is brave or heroic enough to be a firefighter; an individual must prove himself worthy. In essence, the fire-setting is a means to an end. If the quest for significance is strong enough, manufacturing an opportunity to prove significance may provide a solution. For a narcissist, the quest must be satisfied again and again. The linkage between societal and familial rejection, as revealed in the profile, and the drive to establish an identity through heroism suggests a need for further evaluation of human behavior, specifically the drive to appear heroic, in other contexts.

The real significance in the development of an arson-by-firefighter profile was not its use as a tool for apprehension; it was the development of screening and prevention programs. Essentially, these programs counter the problem by acknowledging its existence. In programs such as “Hero to Zero,” arson investigators show young firefighters the real consequences of arson, such as civilian or firefighter death and injury. The programs do not single out individuals who seemingly match the firefighter arsonist profile. Instead, they emphasize the significance of being a firefighter and the shame of being caught fire-setting. Aggressive prosecutions and these highly successful programs—which push a strong counter-narrative to young, impressionable firefighters about the very real consequences of arson—have turned the tide on the epidemic.

¹³⁰ Like the happenings in Plato’s parable of the cave. C.G. Jung, “The Dual Mother,” in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, eds. Gerhard Adler and R. F. C. Hull (New York: Bollingen, 1975), 391.

¹³¹ Hinds-Aldrich, “Firesetting.”

B. ARSONIST FIREFIGHTERS

The arson-by-firefighter phenomenon has been the subject of academic and scientific study, news reports, books, and even motion pictures for many years. One of the earliest recorded cases is that of John Stallan, a firefighter in Shelford, England, who confessed to setting eleven fires and was executed on December 7, 1833.¹³² The movie *Backdraft*, about a team of firefighters on the trail of a serial arsonist and which grossed more than \$152 million, was the most successful movie ever made about firefighters.¹³³ In the final scenes, the arsonist is revealed to be “Axe,” a seemingly heroic firefighter. The concept that a trained firefighter would maliciously start a fire shocks the conscious.

Fact, however, is stranger than fiction. *Backdraft* is loosely based on real-life, grievance-driven “heroic” firebugs who claimed to be protesting Boston firefighter layoffs by starting as many as 264 fires and injuring 360 people.¹³⁴ The character Axe is based on firefighter Ray Norton, Jr., known within his department as “Crazy Ray” and viewed as an oddball; his car displayed vanity tags spelling ARSON.¹³⁵ Another among the firebugs, Donald Stackpole, was a security guard who yearned to be a firefighter. Stackpole had been convicted of a felony for receiving stolen property and was therefore banned from serving as a firefighter. Nonetheless, he drove a red car equipped with lights, a siren, and a tailgate reading “FIRE DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY.” Moreover, his security guard uniform resembled that of a Boston Fire Department fire chief.¹³⁶ Stackpole not only responded to fires but also mentored a young security guard, Gregg Bemis, who aspired to be a firefighter, too.

¹³² Rachel Monroe, “Fire Bugs,” *The Awl*, December 4, 2013, <https://theawl.com/fire-bugs-28a100fc04b4#.l6bqfxmdb>.

¹³³ Shea Gunther, “Seven Top Grossing Movies about Firefighters,” *Resole America Blog*, accessed March 14, 2017, <http://resoleblog.com/seven-top-grossing-movies-about-firefighters/>.

¹³⁴ Dudley Clendinen, About Boston, *New York Times*, November 15, 1984.

¹³⁵ Stephanie Schorow, *Boston on Fire: A History of Fires and Firefighting in Boston* (Beverly, MA: Commonwealth Editions, 2006), 199.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

In 1981, Massachusetts passed a statewide tax reduction initiative that resulted in roughly 500 firefighter layoffs.¹³⁷ Within months, officials noticed an appreciable increase in suspicious fires. Typically, the fires were set in abandoned buildings using cigarettes and a book of matches in a bag containing a lantern fuel.¹³⁸ Over several months, the frequency and severity of the fires increased, including one fire on June 3, 1982, that injured thirty-one firefighters and caused \$13 million in damage.¹³⁹ The tax initiative crushed the aspirations of firefighter applicants like Bemis. In July 1982, Bemis sent a local television station a letter assembled from magazine cutouts reading:

I'm Mr. Flare You know me as the Friday firebug.
I WILL Continue till ALL
deactivated police and
fire equipment is brought BACK.
If abandoned buildings are torn down, occupied buildings
will BE targeted.¹⁴⁰

In July 1984, Bemis, Stackpole, Norton, and three other real or aspiring firefighters were arrested and charged with setting 163 fires. Regarding Stackpole, Bemis testified his mentor was obsessed with being a firefighter: “Donny was very malicious. At first I didn’t see it. Then I realized he actually wanted to hurt firefighters.”¹⁴¹ All of the firebugs were convicted and received lengthy sentences.¹⁴²

The grievance that supposedly motivated this group was the layoff of hundreds of firefighters; yet—similar to radicalized Westerners—only a very small percentage of Boston’s firefighters chose to respond with violence in the form of arson. Hundreds of fires were set with significant damage and injuries to numerous firefighters. After the June 1982 fire that injured thirty-one firefighters, Bemis bragged about the success,

¹³⁷ Ibid., 200.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 202.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 200.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 203.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 209.

¹⁴² United States v. Stackpole, 811 F2d 689 (1987).

calling himself “Mr. Flare.” Clearly, something more than grievance caused this small group of firefighters to become fire-setters.

C. COMPLEXITY AND THE MUCH-MALIGNED PROFILE

The term “criminal profile” is perhaps as commonplace as it is misunderstood. Popular culture and the media have answered the public’s near-insatiable desire for crime dramas with criminal profilers possessing impeccable accuracy.¹⁴³ In reality, over-zealous experts, some with limited or questionable resumes, have similarly proffered opinions with claimed but nonexistent exactitude.¹⁴⁴ Confusion between appropriate criminal profiling and racial profiling has caused an overly sensitive pursuit of political correctness.¹⁴⁵

Jung described complexes as bundles of subconscious beliefs or ideas that “operate relatively autonomously and interfere with the intentions of the will, disturbing the memory and conscious performance. Jung stressed that complexes are not negative in of themselves, but their effects often are.”¹⁴⁶ Thus, the interrelationship between the conscious and subconscious complex is by nature complex and not complicated.¹⁴⁷ Like Lorenz’s butterfly effect, the existence of a complex may have little to no effect on a person’s behavior or it may have a massive effect, depending on a host of variables. As General Stanley McChrystal explains:

The significance of Lorenz’s butterfly effect is not ... just the nonlinear escalation of a minor input to a major output. There’s uncertainty involved; the amplification of the disturbance is not the product of a single, constant, identifiable magnifying factor—any number of seemingly

¹⁴³ Lynne Malcom, “Profiling the Criminal Profilers—The Inside Story,” *RN*, September 3, 2011, <http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/allinthemind/profiling-the-criminal-profilers---the-inside-story/2935850>.

¹⁴⁴ Lee Rainbow and Adam Gregory, “What Behavioural Investigative Advisors Actually Do,” in *Professionalizing Offender Profiling*, eds. Laurence Allison and Lee Rainbow (London: Routledge, 2011), 20.

¹⁴⁵ “Racial Profiling: Definition,” ACLU, accessed March 14, 2017, <https://www.aclu.org/other/racial-profiling-definition>.

¹⁴⁶ *New World Encyclopedia*, s.v. “Carl Jung,” last modified January 11, 2017, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Carl_Jung.

¹⁴⁷ Stanley McChrystal, *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World* (London: Penguin, 2015), 58–59.

insignificant inputs might or might not result in nonlinear escalation. If every butterfly's fluttering always led to a hurricane halfway across the world two days later, weather would be predictable (if insane). The butterfly's fluttering leads to a storm only if thousands of other minor conditions are just right. And those conditions are so precise as to be practically immeasurable, rendering the outcome unpredictable.¹⁴⁸

Just as some individuals may be more vulnerable to influences of a subconscious complex, others may be far less susceptible. In other words, the complex, or bundle of subconscious beliefs and feelings, is just that: subconscious beliefs or feelings that affect behavior. The existence of a complex or the significant resemblance to the description contained within a profile does not suggest the certainty of any particular behavior. Nor would it necessarily support a legal defense in a criminal action such as an "irresistible impulse" that completely controls one's behavior. Instead, the concept is best understood in the light of complexity. Under very specific alignments of a multitude of variables, the complex may explain behavior.

This inability to appreciate complexity as it pertains to the hero complex led to the incorrect "profiling" of Richard Jewell in the Atlanta Olympics bombing.¹⁴⁹ Shortly after midnight on July 27, 1996, Richard Jewell discovered, and reported, a backpack containing three pipe bombs. The discovery led to an evacuation and likely prevented death or injury of numerous people. Although he was initially viewed as a hero, a leaked FBI profile caused Jewell to become viewed as a villain. Jewell was eventually exonerated after Eric Rudolph was identified as the actual bomber. The leaked profile and information from an employer alleging Jewell was a "badge-wearing zealot" caused the public persecution of a man who legitimately should have been regarded as a hero.¹⁵⁰

In truth, a criminal profile has as its goal: "To identify gross personality and behavioral characteristics that may set the criminal apart from other members of

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 58.

¹⁴⁹ Ronald J. Ostrow, "Richard Jewell Case Study," Columbia, June 13, 2000, <http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/j6075/edit/readings/jewell.html>.

¹⁵⁰ Adam Bernstein, "Richard A. Jewell; Wrongly Linked to Olympic Bombing" *Washington Post*, August 29, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/29/AR2007082901624.html>

society.”¹⁵¹ Similarly, a psychological profile has as its goal: to assess a known individual for a specific purpose, such as a workplace threat assessment.¹⁵² In each instance, analyses of personality types or characteristics explain behavior with some degree of consistency. The profile’s value must take the mind’s complexity into account; it must appreciate that, while consistency does exist, “behavior is not invariably consistent.”¹⁵³

The study of offenders, however, has isolated several reoccurring themes: the offender’s desire to appear heroic, characteristics of a young person rejected by family and by society, poor social and interpersonal skills, poor work history, and other isolation or failures. Taken collectively, these characteristics suggest a need to be important to others, and heroism is the vehicle to establish that importance or identity. Many individuals, however, come from broken homes and become firefighters without becoming arsonists. Thus, establishing the profile of an arsonist firefighter, while significant, must be regarded within its inherent limitations.

D. FIRE INVESTIGATOR JOHN ORR: A CASE STUDY

In his successful book *Fire Lover*, crime writer Joseph Wambaugh profiled the true life story of former fire captain and well-known arson investigator John Orr. Orr is believed to be the most prolific firefighter arsonist in history.¹⁵⁴ In fact, in the year following his arrest, suspicious fires in the Los Angeles basin dropped by 75 percent.¹⁵⁵ Believed to have started 2,000 fires, Orr has become synonymous with the arson-by-firefighter phenomenon.¹⁵⁶ For several years, Orr had been successful as a Glendale firefighter and arson investigator. However, his life was marred by rejection and failure.

¹⁵¹ Wayne Petherick, “The Fallacy of Accuracy in Criminal Profiling,” In *Serial Crime: Theoretical and Practical Issues in Behavioral Profiling*, 109–122 (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2009), 109.

¹⁵² Curt Bartol and Anne Bartol, *Criminal & Behavioral Profiling* (London: Sage, 2013), 171–173.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 169.

¹⁵⁴ Wambaugh, *Firelover*.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ Thomas, “Arson.”

When asked to summarize his childhood for pre-employment or promotional purposes, John Orr described the idyllic television series *Ozzie and Harriet*. Perhaps that was the case during the early part of Orr's childhood, living with both parents in a two-bedroom house on his grandfather's property. However, when Orr was sixteen, his mother left, leaving nothing but a note stating she would call in a few days. While his mother called days later to notify the family she had returned to her childhood home, she had essentially abandoned her family. Orr would not see her again for three years.

After being abandoned by his mother, Orr continued to experience rejection. On his 18th birthday, Orr entered the United States Air Force. He served as a firefighter in Spain and in Great Falls, Montana. His experiences as a firefighter while in the military were uneventful. They included only two crashes and one off-duty fire in four years. During this period, he also married his high school girlfriend. Orr left the Air Force after serving four years; in the following months, his life was increasingly disaffected. He briefly worked a series of odd jobs, including several in the fast food service. Orr's marriage, which had at that point borne two infant children, was also dissolving. Ultimately, much like his mother, Orr left a note for his wife indicating he was moving in with a coworker.

During this time, Orr applied to the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, and the Los Angeles City and County Fire Departments. Orr was rejected by each agency. Though he passed the written and physical agility tests for the LAPD, he was rejected pursuant to a psychological evaluation. The evaluation read:

Non-acceptable applicant. Reason for rejection based upon past history and test results. Currently having marital problems with separation. Recently walked off a job, gave no notice. Supervisors gave him poor evaluation, described him as goof off, know it all, irresponsible and immature. The testing re-emphasizes this. Rorschach showed him passive, indecisive, with problems with women and sex. The [Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory] confirmed this and showed a schizoid person who is withdrawn from people and may have sexual confusion in

his orientation. Very non-objective. Diagnosis: personality trait disturbance. Emotionally unstable personality.¹⁵⁷

After Orr's rejection from the LAPD, he was accepted into the Los Angeles County Fire Department Academy. Orr believed he was well qualified to be a firefighter and, perhaps as a result, trained and studied infrequently. Orr was surprised when the faculty disagreed with his assessment and invited him to withdraw. He declined and was ultimately dropped from the Fire Academy for failing both physical and written tests. Orr would later describe the experience as "paralyzing."¹⁵⁸ Out of what he described as desperation, Orr applied to and was hired by the Glendale City Fire Department. After graduating from an eight-week academy, he was assigned as a fulltime firefighter.

Though he was not a police officer, Orr tried to portray himself as one. He also started working part time at a 7-Eleven, where he was seemingly obsessed with the detection and arrest of shoplifters. He eventually became a mall security guard and repeatedly engaged in odd behavior that earned him nicknames such as "cop wannabe, Dirty Harry or Inspector Clouseau" in both the fire and police departments.¹⁵⁹ Orr hung out in cop bars and essentially pretended to be a police officer.¹⁶⁰ This behavior included one incident involving the pursuit and detention of a burglary suspect in a small white fire truck.¹⁶¹

During Orr's early years as a firefighter, the City of Glendale began experiencing a series of unexplained and unsolved fires. These unsolved arsons led to the creation of an arson investigator position. Orr seemed like the right fit; after all, he seemed always to arrive first at the scene of a fire. "We just thought, 'Wow, this guy has such knowledge.' He was miraculously fast at finding the causes of fires. He could dig through the ashes, narrow it down and we'd be, like, 'Man, you're good,'" explained Glendale Fire

¹⁵⁷ Wambaugh, *Firelover*, 29.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 26.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*; At trial, Sheila Bell would testify that Orr identified himself as a deputy sheriff shortly after a fire at her business.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.* 33–35.

Inspector Tom Probst.¹⁶² Arson task force investigators from neighboring fire departments witnessed Orr's impressive investigation prowess. They described incidents "when they'd gathered at fire sites trying to figure out an area of origin when [Orr] would drive up, gaze at the area, stroke his mustache, and like a water seeker with a divining rod, say, 'I believe the point of origin ... there.' And lo! The Glendale arson investigator would go to where he'd pointed and find the remnant of an incendiary device under a rock."¹⁶³

Orr spent the next several years as an arson investigator and eventually an instructor, all the while starting countless fires. Eventually, an investigator correlated arson conferences and arson fires. Investigators determined that while traveling to Fresno or Pacific Grove for conferences, Orr would light fires along the way. His thumbprint was ultimately matched to an incendiary device. Although he was never charged, Orr was later suspected of being the serial arsonist actively working the City of Glendale. After Orr's arrest, investigators reviewed sixteen Glendale arson reports occurring during an eight-month period in 1985.¹⁶⁴

Perhaps most revealing of Orr's mind was his book, *Points of Origin*, named for the point where a fire originates. Orr's 350-page manuscript was seized during his arrest. In a letter to a literary agent, Orr described his novel as "a fact based work that follows the pattern of an actual arsonist that has been setting serial fires in California over the past eight years. He has not been identified or apprehended, and probably will not be in the near future. As in the real case, the arsonist in my novel is a firefighter."¹⁶⁵ Orr's "fictional" firefighter arsonist is an arson investigator named Aaron Stiles. The investigator attends an arson conference in Fresno, yet like Jung's metaphorical fire-setting dragon, "divorc[es] himself from the fact that he was an arsonist."¹⁶⁶ Orr was

¹⁶² Thomas, "Arson."

¹⁶³ Wambaugh, *Firelover*, 143.

¹⁶³ John L. Orr, *Points of Origin: Playing with Fire* (Haverford, PA: Infinity, 2001).

¹⁶⁴ Wambaugh, *Firelover*, 143.

¹⁶⁵ Orr, *Points of Origin*.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

eventually convicted of four counts of murder and of setting numerous fires, earning him life sentences in state and federal court.¹⁶⁷

A detailed analysis of Orr's life reads like a virtual checklist of the arson-by-firefighter profile. He is a white male, abandoned by his mother at sixteen, began starting fires in early twenties, failed a psych evaluation for the LAPD, failed out of a fire academy, essentially abandoned his first wife and kids, and remarried on a weekend whim. The LAPD psychological evaluation supports this and adds additional sexual orientation confusion. At trial, Dr. Ronald Markman, a defense expert, testified Orr was a pyromaniac.¹⁶⁸ During cross examination, Dr. Markman admitted that though Orr denied it, he believed the psychological evaluation and rejection by LAPD affected Orr until the day of his trial.¹⁶⁹

Orr's repeated failures after leaving the Air Force suggest he may have first started setting fires when he was a susceptible "in-betweeners," as described by Olssen and Singer.¹⁷⁰ The same factors relate to the hero complex: abandoned and not appreciated, followed by repeated failures, then an increasing sense of being undervalued or unappreciated by police officers despite countless arrests by the firefighter. Fires are set, and Orr saves the day by being first on the scene. He steps in as Glendale's first arson investigator. Seemingly from lack of recognition, he escalates over time and even writes a novel about a firefighter arsonist so prolific, yet so clever, he would never be caught.¹⁷¹ While Orr has never admitted responsibility for his actions, his life and conduct embody the hero complex and quest for significance. Moreover, Orr's narcissism fueled his addiction to recognition and admiration.

¹⁶⁷ U.S. Fire Administration, *Firefighter Arson*.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.; Rebekah Doley, "Pyromania: Fact or Fiction?" *British Journal of Criminology* 43, no. 4 (October 2003): 797–807.

¹⁶⁹ People of the State of California v. John Orr, Sp. Ct. 37, No. BA116081 (1998), RT vol. 36, 6644–6668.

¹⁷⁰ Margaret Singer, *Cults in Our Midst: The Hidden Menace in Our Everyday Lives* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995), 21.

¹⁷¹ Orr, *Points of Origin*.

E. CONCLUSION

Being heroic is admirable—unless the hero's compulsion is so strong that he manufactures the crisis. Perhaps Jung was referring to this when he wrote: "The hero myth is an unconscious drama scene only in projection, like the happenings in Plato's Allegory of the Cave. The hero himself appears as a being of more than human stature. He is distinguished from the very being by his godlike characteristics."¹⁷² John Orr's life and crimes coincide with the theoretical frameworks of the hero complex and the quest for significance united through narcissism. Moreover, the conceptual framework of the dark triad—the personality traits of narcissism, psychopathology, and Machiavellianism—aptly characterizes Orr.¹⁷³

Orr, a social outcast and wannabe cop who turned to death and violence in the quest for significance, is not alone in embodying these frameworks. Omar Mateen, the ISIS-inspired Orlando nightclub terrorist, eerily parallels Orr and the frameworks of the hero complex and quest for significance. Moreover, the terrorist organization that inspired Mateen seems to grasp the power of the quest and has tailored its efforts to recruit and inspire Westerners.

¹⁷² Jung, "The Dual Mother," 391.

¹⁷³ Paulhus, and Williams, "The Dark Triad."

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IV. THE RISE OF ISIS AND THE RECRUITMENT OF VULNERABLE WESTERNERS

In the last several years, the United States and its European allies have made significant overtures to mitigate perceived grievances of Islamic extremists. For instance, Western governments have dramatically reduced both the presence of service members in the Middle East, to the point of essentially vacating Iraq in 2010, and the number of detainees at Guantanamo Bay. In the years after 9/11, the number of Western homegrown Islamic extremists indicted or killed averaged in the low to mid-teens. Those numbers rose to forty-five in 2009 and then averaged twenty-three per year until a spike of seventy-three in 2015.¹⁷⁴ Specifically, the rate of radicalization—persons radicalizing to point of violence or becoming foreign fighters—greatly increased in 2014 and 2015.¹⁷⁵

A dramatic increase in ISIS recruitment seems to coincide with its caliphate declaration in June 2014. In fact, according to a United Nation's report, between mid-2014 and March 2015, the number of Islamic foreign fighters surged by 71 percent.¹⁷⁶ In the United States, there have been 580 terror-related convictions, and between March 2014 and June 2016, more than 131 U.S. citizens have been implicated in terror.¹⁷⁷ The dramatic trends in recruitment and radicalization correspond with changing circumstances. This chapter examines the successful strategies employed by ISIS that capitalize on these circumstances and inspire radicalization.

¹⁷⁴ Bergin et al., "Terrorism in America."

¹⁷⁵ Berger "Anatomy of the Terror Threat."

¹⁷⁶ "Foreign Fighters," BBC.

¹⁷⁷ Berger "Anatomy of the Terror Threat"; Noonan and Khalil, "North American Foreign Fighters."

A. THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE AND ITS EFFORTS TO RECRUIT OR INSPIRE

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

—Sun Tzu¹⁷⁸

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as ISIL or *Daesh*, is a self-proclaimed state that has controlled major portions of Iraq and Syria. ISIS is a Salafi militant group following a fundamentalist, Wahhabi faction of Sunni Islam. While the precise origins of ISIS depend on the relative starting point on a timeline, it is generally regarded as evolving from a series of organizations including al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which was formed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006.¹⁷⁹ As a result of the U.S. troop surge in Iraq and other measures, by June 2010 General Ray Odierno described AQI's leadership as "neutralized."¹⁸⁰ Over the next few years, as the United States withdrew from Iraq, AQI morphed into a more powerful organization. By the end of 2013, the organization now calling itself the Islamic State in Iraq occupied and controlled significant territory, including the urban areas of Ramadi and Fallujah.¹⁸¹

In June 2014, the organization renamed itself the Islamic State and declared a caliphate, despite other countries' refusal to regard its statehood.¹⁸² While best known to the world for terror and violence, ISIS possesses a system of laws loosely based on those

¹⁷⁸ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (Washington, DC: Filiquarian, 2007).

¹⁷⁹ Although there never actually existed an organization calling itself AQI, it has generally been referred to be that name; Michael Knights, "ISIL's Stand in the Ramadi Falluja Corridor," Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 29, 2014, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-isils-stand-in-the-ramadi-falluja-corridor>.

¹⁸⁰ Thom Shanker, "Qaeda leaders in Iraq neutralized, says U.S.," *New York Times*, June 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/05/world/middleeast/05military.html?_r=0.

¹⁸¹ Knights, "ISIL's stand in the Ramadi Falluja Corridor."

¹⁸² Adam Withnall, "Iraq Crisis: ISIS Changes Name and Declares its Territories a New Islamic State with the Restoration of a Caliphate in the Middle East," *Independent*, June 30, 2014, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-declares-new-islamic-state-in-middle-east-with-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-as-emir-removing-iraq-and-9571374.html>.

of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century. Stephen M. Walt, a Harvard professor of international affairs, has described the group as a “revolutionary state-building organization.”¹⁸³ Moreover, according to Bruce Hoffman, the West has underappreciated ISIS’s ability to function as a conventional military and to demonstrate an “embryonic capacity to function as a legitimate governing entity”; this has afforded the group legitimacy, which it levies for radicalization and recruitment.¹⁸⁴

By December 2015, ISIS controlled huge portions of Iraq and Syria, with populations estimated between three and eight million people, and increasingly behaved as a functioning government.¹⁸⁵ Recovered documents referred to as the “ISIS papers” detail the group’s methodical bureaucracy for managing governmental affairs and strategies for becoming a viable state.¹⁸⁶ This fledgling government includes civil servants who regulate functions such as recruiting teachers for schools and agricultural planning during the growing season.¹⁸⁷ By officiating “temporary marriages” and notarizing sex slave “contracts,” fighters are rewarded while maintaining strict compliance with a perverted Salafi-jihadist mandate.¹⁸⁸ ISIS has boasted significant tax revenues and massive oil sales to finance and maintain a standing army.¹⁸⁹ Less than one

¹⁸³ Tim Arango, “ISIS Transforming into a Functioning State that Uses Terror as a Tool,” *New York Times*, July 22, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/world/middleeast/isis-transforming-into-functioning-state-that-uses-terror-as-tool.html>.

¹⁸⁴ Bruce Hoffman, “The Foreign Fighter Problem Goes Global,” *National Interest*, December 14, 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-here-return-the-jihadi-14600>.

¹⁸⁵ Sarah Birke, “How ISIS Rules,” *New York Review of Books*, February 5, 2015, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/02/05/how-isis-rules/>.

¹⁸⁶ “The ISIS Papers: A Master Plan for Consolidating Power,” *Guardian*, December 7, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/07/islamic-state-document-masterplan-for-power>.

¹⁸⁷ Shiv Malik, “The ISIS Papers: Behind the ‘Death Cult’ Image Lies a Methodical Bureaucracy,” *Guardian*, December 7, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/07/isis-papers-guardian-syria-iraq-bureaucracy>.

¹⁸⁸ Fawaz Gerges, “The World According to ISIS,” *Foreign Policy Journal*, March 18, 2016, <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/03/18/the-world-according-to-isis/>; Vishakha Sonawane, “ISIS Executes at Least 250 Women for Refusing Temporary Marriage in Iraq’s Mosul,” *International Business Times*, April 21, 2016, <http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-executes-least-250-women-refusing-temporary-marriage-iraqs-mosul-2357113>.

¹⁸⁹ Audrey Kurth Cronin, “ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-not-terrorist-group>.

year after announcing the caliphate, ISIS was estimated to have recruited 25,000 foreign fighters from 100 countries.¹⁹⁰

According to retired General Jack Keane, ISIS has three goals. First, it aims to defend or expand its existing territory in Iraq and Syria; attaining this goal requires financing as well as significant recruiting. Second, it seeks to expand its “near” influence by establishing organizational structures and relationships in its own region. Third, it strives to expand its influence worldwide by “inspiring, motivating or directing” violence by persons in their host or native countries.¹⁹¹ Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper identified ISIS as the “the preeminent terrorist threat because of its self-described caliphate in Syria and Iraq, its branches and emerging branches in other countries, and its increasing ability to direct and inspire attacks against a wide range of targets around the world.”¹⁹² According to Clapper, more than 6,600 Westerners have traveled to fight alongside ISIS, and U.S.-based homegrown violent extremists inspired—but not necessarily directed—by ISIS constitute the greatest threat to the U.S. homeland.

In October 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter announced major changes in U.S. strategy toward ISIS. The new strategy was more militarily aggressive, with an emphasis on retaking Raqqa and Ramadi while attacking and “raiding” the Islamic State.¹⁹³ By December 2015, President Obama characterized the U.S.-led efforts as hitting ISIS “harder than ever,” and November 2015 included the highest monthly number of airstrikes to date.¹⁹⁴ Following the shift in policy, by May 2016 ISIS had lost

¹⁹⁰ “Foreign Fighters,” BBC.

¹⁹¹ General Jack Keane, “After San Bernardino: The Future of ISIS-Inspired Attacks,” testimony before House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, February 2016.

¹⁹² James Clapper, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community* (Washington, DC: Senate Armed Services Committee, 2016), 4, <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clapper>.

¹⁹³ Jeremy Bender, “The Pentagon Is about to Make Major Changes to its ISIS Strategy,” *Business Insider*, October 27, 2015, <http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-strategy-shift-pentagon-2015-10>.

¹⁹⁴ Kevin Liptak, “Obama: ISIS Strategy ‘Moving Forward with a Great Sense of Urgency,’” CNN, December 14, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/14/politics/obama-pentagon-isis-strategy/>.

45 percent of its territory in Iraq and 20 percent in Syria.¹⁹⁵ In contrast to the formerly estimated peak of 2,000 foreign fighters that crossed the Turkish–Syrian border each month, recent U.S. intelligence reports identify as few as fifty crossings.¹⁹⁶

The sudden increase and subsequent decrease in ISIS’s ability to recruit and inspire is not coincidental. It appears to correspond with several aligning factors, including a winning message, a susceptible target, and the resourceful use of the Internet and existing networks. The winning message was the creation of an idyllic jihadi battlefield of heroism, which capitalized on changing circumstances in Iraq, including increasing corruption within the Iraqi government after U.S. withdrawal. By learning from experience, ISIS identified the profile of a person susceptible to radicalization. Finally, ISIS adeptly employed evolving technology to connect effectively with those individuals. As the West reasserted itself, increasing the number of attacks and U.S. presence–fueled grievances, the influx of foreign fighters dramatically decreased. While the decrease may be attributed in part to better regional intelligence cooperation, it is also probable that significant jihadi successes contributed to increased radicalization and recruitment. Western attempts to mitigate grievances followed a reverse pattern; increased U.S. effort to mitigate grievances also increased radicalization and reassertion.

B. ISIS RECRUITMENT, INSPIRATION, AND RADICALIZATION

ISIS’s successful ability to recruit and inspire radicalization lies within the group’s pioneering use of the Internet. As President Obama explained, “The Internet erases the distance between countries, we see growing efforts by terrorists to poison the minds of people like the Boston Marathon bombers and the San Bernardino killers.”¹⁹⁷ The Internet permits the like-minded one-in-a-million—separated by geography but now connected with a keystroke—who would seek to harm Americans. A December 2015

¹⁹⁵ Jim Michaels, “ISIS Had Lost 45% of its Territory in Iraq, and 20% in Syria,” *Military Times*, May 17, 2016, <http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2016/05/17/isis-loses-45-percent-territory-iraq-20-percent-syria/84512408/>.

¹⁹⁶ Griff Witte, Sudarsan Raghaven, and James McAuley, “Flow of Foreign Fighters Plummets as Islamic State Loses its Edge,” *Chicago Tribune*, September 10, 2016, <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-islamic-state-foreign-fighters-plummet-20160910-story.html>.

¹⁹⁷ Barack Obama, “Address to the Nation by the President,” the White House, December 6, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/06/address-nation-president>.

report by Vidino and Hughes, published by the George Washington University Program on Extremism, examines ISIS's efforts to create an online Twitter swarm.¹⁹⁸ They theorized: When a limited number of ISIS Twitter users assume numerous online aliases (as many as 500 each), they can cast a net wide enough to connect every one in 100,000. Then, when the rare lonely, disconnected, vulnerable individual is identified, ISIS methodically grooms the relationship. In other words, the Internet permits terrorist organizations such as ISIS to cast an extraordinarily wide net to reach and inspire the susceptible few. The power of the Internet was similarly underscored in a master's thesis titled "Risky Shift toward Online Activism: Do Hacktivists Pose a Threat to the Homeland?"¹⁹⁹ Disconnected activists scattered throughout the world are empowered by the Internet through social media. In the case of extremists, social media may be more appropriately termed the *anti-social network*. In 2001, a RAND Corporation study foresaw this evolution in extremist interdependence on the Internet and coined the term "netwar."²⁰⁰ In fact, extremist dependence on the Internet to recruit, groom, inspire, and direct radicals ensures a virtual footprint of radicalization.²⁰¹

However, even with ISIS's declaration of a caliphate, its capture of vast parts of Syria and Iraq, and its ability to use the Internet strategically, not all Muslims who are sympathetic to the cause of restoring an Islamic state suddenly radicalize. In fact, only a very small number in the eligible cohort have radicalized or sought to join ISIS. Perhaps Zimbardo was wrong; not every angel is capable of becoming a demon, nor every demon an angel. Not every Muslim is lured by the appeal of beheadings and immolations of people in cages.²⁰²

¹⁹⁸ Lorenzo Vidino, Seamus Hughes, "ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa," George Washington University, December 2015, <http://cchs.gwu.edu/isis-in-america>.

¹⁹⁹ Brian Murphy, "Risky Shift toward Online Activism: Do Hacktivists Pose a Threat to the Homeland?" (master's theses, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), <https://www.hSDL.org/?abstract&did=760380>.

²⁰⁰ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).

²⁰¹ Isaac R. Porche III and Colin P. Clark, "Following Online Footprints to Catch Terrorists," *The RAND Blog*, December 28, 2015, <http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/12/following-online-footprints-to-catch-terrorists.html>.

²⁰² Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect*.

C. THE ISIS PROFILE FOR RECRUITMENT OR INSPIRATION

ISIS has seemingly identified a psychopathology or susceptibility to radicalization in the individuals it recruits. ISIS has achieved strategic gains by understanding the power of harnessing the individual's need for significance. The group's ability to employ pop culture and the Internet to vitiate geographic boundaries has contributed directly to the increase in radicalization.²⁰³

ISIS and al Qaeda have leveraged the absence of a natural firewall, stemming from an individual's vulnerability from isolation and a need for meaning in life, in their recruiting tactics.²⁰⁴ For this reason, both groups target Westerners online who have been isolated in college.²⁰⁵ In the widely distributed fifty-page manual entitled *A Course in the Art of Recruitment*, Abu `Amr al-Qa`idi advises, "The university is like a place of isolation for a period of four, five, or six years and is full of youths (full of zeal, vigor, and anti-government sentiments)."²⁰⁶ ISIS "seeks out seemingly vulnerable people and shower[s] them with constant attention—giving them the sense of belonging and identity affirmation they seek."²⁰⁷ Similarly, Erin Hug identifies the role isolation may play in radicalization by examining the lives of three well-documented terrorists, Timothy McVeigh, Anders Behring Breivik, and Omar Hammami.²⁰⁸ Each experienced perceived or actual societal or familial isolation. These similarities are not anecdotal. An analysis of 101 offenders revealed an average age of twenty-six, and "most were attracted at least in

²⁰³ Joseph Russo, "The Power of Pop Culture in the Hands of ISIS," in *Foundations of Homeland Security: Law and Policy*, Second Edition, ed. Martin J. Alperen (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2017).

²⁰⁴ Ibid.; Pamela Engle, "Here's the Manual that Al Qaeda and now ISIS Use to Brainwash People Online," *Business Insider*, July 2, 2015, <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-manual-al-qaeda-and-now-isis-use-to-brainwash-people-online-2015-7>.

²⁰⁵ Engle, "Here's the Manual."

²⁰⁶ Ibid.; Abdullah Wariis and Brian Fishman, "A Jihadist's Course in the Art of Recruitment," Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, February 15, 2009, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-jihadist%E2%80%99s-course-in-the-art-of-recruitment>; see also for original text: https://archive.org/stream/ACourseInTheArtOfRecruiting-RevisedJuly2010/A_Course_in_the_Art_of_Recruiting_-_Revised_July2010_djvu.txt.

²⁰⁷ Christina Nemr, "Countering Islamic State Recruitment: You're Doing it Totally Wrong," *War on the Rocks*, July 14, 2015, <http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/countering-islamic-state-recruitment-youre-doing-it-totally-wrong/>.

²⁰⁸ Erin Hug, "The Role of Isolation in Radicalization: How Important Is it?" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013).

part by social media, and many had expressed some form of social alienation, loneliness or identity issues”; fully one-third had converted to Islam and were characterized as “political seekers.”²⁰⁹ Additionally, Abu `Amr al-Qa`idi suggests that neither the recruiter nor the recruits need to be well versed in the Quran. Recruits should not be well educated or religious. “This is because you will be the one to guide him (i.e., this nonreligious Muslim) to the right path; and you can choose who you want to be with you in your brigade, God willing. This sector (contains candidates) without limit, especially the youths.”²¹⁰ Through a slow, methodical process, recruits are lured to a cause that gives their lives meaning, at least in the hereafter.²¹¹

If John Orr epitomizes the arson by firefighter phenomenon, Omar Mateen epitomizes the radicalized Westerner. Somehow, Mateen went from a life as an aspiring law enforcement officer to a mass murderer. Although it is difficult to develop a complete picture of Mateen’s life leading up to the attack, it has been reported that he was an outcast in school. His mother was arrested for domestic violence when Mateen was sixteen years old, and the arrest affidavit reveals prior incidents of domestic violence (see Appendix B). At least one published report suggested Mateen’s mother was noticeably absent from his school records.²¹² In fact, Mateen’s lengthy school disciplinary records include forty-eight days of suspensions for various offenses, including violence, and numerous mentions of interactions with his father but none with

²⁰⁹ “Case by Case: ISIS Prosecutions in the United States,” Center on National Security at Fordham Law, July 2016, 2–3, <http://www.centeronnationalsecurity.org/research/>.

²¹⁰ Engle, “Here’s the Manual.”

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Shane Harris, Brandy Zadrozny, and Katie Zavadski, “The Unhinged Home That Raised Orlando Killer Omar Mateen,” *The Daily Beast*, June 18, 2017, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/06/18/the-unhinged-home-that-raised-orlando-killer-omar-mateen.html?vi>.

his mother.²¹³ In 2009, Mateen was married for four months and was described by his ex-wife as verbally and physically abusive.²¹⁴

John Orr and Omar Mateen were both obsessed with becoming police officers and both were rejected by police forces.²¹⁵ Mateen attempted to become a state trooper, a police officer, and a correctional officer.²¹⁶ He attended Indian River Community College, obtaining a degree in criminal justice technology.²¹⁷ He had a penchant for wearing New York Police Department (NYPD) attire and apparently participated in a trip to Saudi Arabia with several Muslim members of the NYPD.²¹⁸ The weapons he used in the Pulse nightclub massacre were purchased at a gun shop owned by a former NYPD officer.²¹⁹

While Orr found significance through fire-setting and manufactured heroics, Mateen sought significance and redemption from a meaningless life within a jihadi fantasy. He pursued this murderous fantasy even though it was inconsistent with his ideology. For example, according to FBI Director James Comey, Mateen previously pledged support for Shiite terrorist organizations Hezbollah and al-Nusra Front, but

²¹³ Mitch Weiss and Rich Bynum, "Records: Orlando Gunman Talked about Violence in 3rd Grade," *Seattle Times*, June 17, 2016, <http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/apnewsbreak-woman-says-nightclub-shooter-stalked-her/>.

²¹⁴ Jack Healy, "Sitora Yusufiy, Ex-Wife of Orlando Suspect, Describes Abusive Marriage," *New York Times*, June 14, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/sitora-yusufiy-omar-mateen-orlando-shooting.html>; Mark Mazzetti, Eric Lichtblau, and Alan Blinder, "Omar Mateen, Twice Scrutinized by F.B.I., Shows Threat of Lone Terrorists," *New York Times*, June 14, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/politics/orlando-shooting-omar-mateen.html?_r=0

²¹⁵ Skyler Swisher, "Omar Mateen Failed Multiple Times to Start Career in Law Enforcement, State Records Show," *Sun Sentinel*, June 16, 2016, <http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/florida/fl-omar-mateen-fdle-records-20160616-story.html>.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Kevin Sullivan and William Wan, "Troubled. Quiet. Macho. Angry. The Volatile Life of the Orlando Shooter," *Washington Post*, June 17, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/troubled-quiet-macho-angry-the-volatile-life-of-omar-mateen/2016/06/17/15229250-34a6-11e6-8758-d58e76e11b12_story.html?utm_term=.f6085d8a4fd0.

²¹⁸ Denis Slattery, "Orlando Gunman Omar Mateen Visited Saudi Arabia on NYU-Sponsored Trip with 12 Muslim NYPD Officers in 2012," *New York Daily News*, June 18, 2016, <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/orlando-gunman-visited-saudi-arabia-nyu-trip-12-nypd-cops-article-1.2678747>.

²¹⁹ Frank Rosario, Larry Celona, and Jamie Schram, "Weapons Used in Nightclub Shooting Bought at ex-NYPD Cop's Gun Shop," *New York Post*, June 13, 2016, <http://nypost.com/2016/06/13/weapons-used-in-nightclub-shooting-bought-at-ex-nypd-cops-gun-shop/>.

during the attack on the Pulse nightclub attack he professed allegiance to the rival Sunni ISIS.²²⁰ For Mateen, the killing was not enough—he insisted his murderous behavior was noble, and wanted the world to know it. He called the media and proclaimed to the world, “I’m the shooter. It’s me. I am the shooter.”²²¹ Perhaps the most revealing quote during Mateen’s 911 call was when he related his fantasy to the Boston bombers: “My homeboy Tamerlan Tsarnaev did his thing on the Boston Marathon, my homeboy (unidentified name) did his thing, okay, so now it’s my turn, okay?”²²² It was his turn, he mused, to follow Tamerlan, who found significance in violence after his failing to make the Olympic team in boxing. It was Mateen’s turn to follow Tamerlan, who planted a pressure cooker bomb near a group of children watching the finish of the Boston marathon.

During one of his 911 calls, Mateen had the following conversation with a negotiator:

Negotiator: Tell me what’s going on right now, Omar.

Suspect: Yo, the airstrike that killed Abu Wahid a few weeks ago--

Negotiator: Okay.

Suspect: That’s what triggered it, okay?

Negotiator: Okay.

Suspect: They should not have bombed and killed Abu Wahid.

Negotiator: I understand.

Suspect: Do your fucking homework and figure out who Abu Wahid is, okay?²²³

²²⁰ Matt Pearce, “FBI Director: Mateen Claimed Loyalty to Islamist Groups That Are Opposed to Each Other,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 16, 2016, <http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-orlando-nightclub-shooting-live-fbi-director-mateen-claimed-loyalty-to-1465837231-htmlstory.html>.

²²¹ Hennessey-Fiske et al., “His Head Is Always Down, and His Lips Is Moving’: Disturbing Portrait Emerging of Orlando Shooter,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 15, 2016, <http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-orlando-nightclub-shooting-20160615-20160614-snap-story.html>.

²²² See transcript in Appendix A, 13:31:39.

²²³ Ibid., 14:08:42–14:09:04.

Clearly, it was important to Mateen not only to be famous for his actions but also to be tied directly to ISIS. Abu Wahid is hardly a household name to most Americans. Nevertheless, connecting his own murderous rampage to the killing of an obscure ISIS leader elevated Mateen.²²⁴

In a matter of a few hours, and at the expense of forty-nine innocent lives, Mateen transformed from insignificant and invisible to a heroic warrior defending the Islamic State. After living a life of insignificance, ISIS provided Mateen with what Doosie describes as “belonging, respect, heroism, status and the notion to fight for a holy cause.”²²⁵

D. THE NARRATIVE OF ISIS

The theme of the caliphate and the apocalyptic jihadist dream is central to ISIS recruiting. In this fantasy, jihadists are awarded meaning to their otherwise meaningless lives, but only through martyrdom in a public forum. The targeted recruiting of individuals who desire a sense of belonging suggests that ISIS leaders—perhaps subconsciously—appreciate Jung’s work and the hero complex. After U.S. forces left Iraq, several factors contributed to radicalization: corruption in the Iraqi government, ISIS success on the battlefield, the declaration of a caliphate, and the promise of heroics.²²⁶ ISIS and its ideological adherents must destroy the world—and typically themselves—in order to save it. Will McCants attributes much of “the inrush of foreign fighters” to the “end-time drama” messaging and the desire to play a role in its legacy.²²⁷

Mohammed Emwazi, who became known as “Jihadi John” based on his British accent and appearance in beheading videos, personified ISIS’s narrative and messaging

²²⁴ Jen Kirby, “Orlando Gunman Omar Mateen Name-drops Obscure ISIS Terrorist in 911 Transcripts,” *New York Daily Intelligencer*, September 26, 2016, <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/09/orlando-gunman-omar-mateens-911-transcripts-released.html>.

²²⁵ Bertjan Doosje et.al., “Terrorism, Radicalism, and De-radicalization,” *Current Opinion in Psychology* 11 (June 2016): 79–84.

²²⁶ Jacob Olidort, “After ISIS: A Smarter Way to Fight,” The Washington Institute, June 21, 2016, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/after-isis-a-smarter-way-to-fight-radicalization>.

²²⁷ William McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State* (New York: St. Martin’s, 2015).

of “jihadi cool.”²²⁸ Prior to his fame as an executioner, Emwazi was known as a rapper named “L Jinny.” His song lyrics opined killing police officers and discussed the struggles in his life, including his father’s incarceration for suspected terrorism when Emwazi was six years old.²²⁹ In addition to actual filmed beheadings, a former hostage, Spanish journalist Javier Espinosa, described Emwazi conducting mock executions seemingly staged for maximum dramatic effect.²³⁰ While the execution videos were shocking to most, the extreme violence and cruelty appealed to a small fraction of followers and potential recruits. By starring in these videos, Emwazi received what Anne Manne termed a “narcissistic hit of attention.”²³¹ To ISIS, its followers, and potential aspirants, the horrific scenes featuring a bound victim’s head literally being sawed off serve as “the crack cocaine of violent extremism, all the elements that make it so alluring and so addictive purified into a crystalized form.”²³² Unlike its murderous predecessors, ISIS publicly revels in the spectacle of killing. Each professionally produced video seems more graphic and heinous than the previous. First came beheading videos; then came images of children executing prisoners and the immolation of Muath Safi Yousef Al-Kasasbeh, a Jordanian Air Force pilot held hostage in a cage. Those who join the group are either “murderously devout” or “devoutly murderous,” as characterized by Thomas McCabe.²³³ Individuals inspired by ISIS and its propaganda join or act because they agree with the organization’s malignant practices.²³⁴

²²⁸ Megan Levy, “How London Rapper L Jinny Became Jihadi John, Suspected of Beheading James Foley,” *Sidney Morning Herald*, August 25, 2014, <http://www.smh.com.au/world/how-london-rapper-l-jinny-became-jihadi-john-suspected-of-beheading-james-foley-20140825-107zdz.html>.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ “Jihadi John Hostage Tells How British Militant ‘Wanted Maximum Drama’ for his Executions,” *Telegraph*, March 15, 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/mohammed-emwazi/11473174/Jihadi-John-hostage-tells-how-British-militant-wanted-maximum-drama-for-his-executions.html>.

²³¹ Anne Manne, “Narcissism and Terrorism: How the Deadly Personality Disorder Leads to Deadly Violence,” *Guardian*, June 8, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/08/narcissism-terrorism-violence-monis-breivik-lubitz-jihadi-john>; see also Anne Manne, *The Life of I Updated Edition: The New Culture of Narcissism* (Victoria, Australia: Melbourne University, 2015).

²³² Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror* (New York: Harper Collins, 2015), 350.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Thomas McCabe, “A Strategy for the ISIS Foreign Fighter Threat,” *Orbis* 60, no. 1 (2015): 140, 143–144, doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2015.12.009.

Radical Islamists, however, did not invent the concept of political violence likely resulting in the actor's death. Long before ISIS or 9/11, during the waning months of World War II, the Japanese employed 3,000 kamikaze pilots to kill nearly 5,000 American service members and sink thirty-four ships.²³⁵ The danger here, however, is in conflating the suicide terrorist with a combatant engaged in a mission that likely results in his or her own death.²³⁶ The adage "one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist" succumbs to this intellectual error. As President Reagan explained:

That's a catchy phrase, but also misleading. Freedom fighters do not need to terrorize a population into submission. Freedom fighters target the military forces and the organized instruments of repression keeping dictatorial regimes in power. Freedom fighters struggle to liberate their citizens from oppression and to establish a form of government that reflects the will of the people. Now, this is not to say that those who are fighting for freedom are perfect or that we should ignore problems arising from passion and conflict. Nevertheless, one has to be blind, ignorant, or simply unwilling to see the truth if he or she is unable to distinguish between those I just described and terrorists. Terrorists intentionally kill or maim unarmed civilians, often women and children, often third parties who are not in any way part of a dictatorial regime. Terrorists are always the enemies of democracy. Luckily, the world is shaking free from its lethargy and moving forward to stop the bloodshed.²³⁷

Some, particularly those ensconced in the safety and comfort of the ivory tower of academia, might contest this distinction; however, it seems particularly apt within the context of individual motivations for Westerners who have radicalized to the point of violence. Suggesting like-mindedness between combatants seeking to keep one another alive and terrorists slaughtering civilians suggests gross naiveté or conscious ignorance. Yet the widely used text *The Psychology of Terrorism* proposes an intellectual, and

²³⁵ Richard Hallion, "Precision Weapons, Power Projection, and the Revolution in Military Affairs," speech, Elgin Air Force Base, May 26, 1999, <https://web.archive.org/web/20090505052709/http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/EARS/Hallionpapers/precisionweaponspower.htm>.

²³⁶ In *Manufacturing Human Bombs*, Mohammed Hafez identifies this distinction by relating the story of Sampson from the Bible. Sampson, imprisoned and tortured, pulls the temple down, killing himself and his torturers. However, Sampson would have likely been killed by his captors had he not brought down the temple. Mohammed Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 2006), 3.

²³⁷ Ronald Reagan, "Radio Address to the Nation on Terrorism," The American Presidency Project, May 31, 1986, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=37376>.

perhaps moral, equivalency between the 9/11 hijackers and U.S. soldiers during World War II:

Judging from this text, the psychology of the 9/11 terrorists is not one of anger or hatred or vengeance. The terrorists are not righting human wrongs but acting with God and for God against evil. In the most general terms, this is a psychology of attachment to the good rather than a psychology of hatred for evil. Research with U.S. soldiers in World War II found something similar; hatred of the enemy was a minor motive (Stouffer et al., 1949). This resonance with the psychology of combat—one that is usually treated as normal psychology—again suggests the possibility that terrorism and terrorists may be more normal than we usually recognize.²³⁸

As President Reagan acknowledges, combatants engaged in war make mistakes, often with significant and deadly consequences. However, American soldiers during World War II ended the German concept of *lebensraum* (meaning racially superior society), and the resulting slaughter of millions during the Holocaust. The kamikaze pilots targeted ships and other military targets, not children and civilians. Moreover, research indicates most soldiers are reluctant to kill armed enemy combatants, let alone civilians.²³⁹ Conversely, the architects of 9/11 murdered thousands of civilians in response to the presence of Americans within the historic lands of the caliphate.

There is debate regarding the definitions of suicide and martyrdom. In the book *From the Terrorists' Point of View*, Fathali Moghaddam asserts, “There is nothing inherent to Islam that leads radical Muslims to adopt *suicide terrorism*” (emphasis added).²⁴⁰ Some scholars cite the Quran, sura 4:29, for the proposition that Islam does not condone suicide.²⁴¹ Many adherents to Islam, however, believe that the faith not only condones martyrdom but also rewards it. Fanaticism differs from mental illness in that it rationalizes “disturbing extreme behavior; the term becomes a descriptive label, rather

²³⁸ Bonger et al., *Psychology of Terrorism*, 19.

²³⁹ Dave Grossman, “Aggression and Violence,” in *Oxford Companion to American Military History*, ed. John Whiteclay Chambers (Oxford: Oxford University, 2000).

²⁴⁰ Moghaddam, *Terrorists' Point of View*, 125.

²⁴¹ Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, “Jihad, Terrorism and Suicide Bombing: The Classical Islamic Perspective,” The Islamic Supreme Council of America, accessed February 10, 2017, <http://islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-rulings/21-jihad-classical-islamic-perspective.html>; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 159.

than an explanation, where the label denotes a relationship between our views and the behavior viewed.”²⁴² In other words, the actor may be sane yet possesses views vastly different from our own as Westerners.

Extremist recruiters and their enabling “scholars,” such as Anwar al-Awlaki and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, understand and employ *selected* Islamic texts to manipulate individuals into acting for the organization’s strategic gain. Yet, for the individual actor, religion is merely incidental to the quest for significance. The life and death of a jihadi is, according to Hafez, guided by “selective references to religious texts, historical narratives based on the life of Muhammad, euphemistic labeling (suicide becomes martyrdom), and the use of ritual and ceremony.”²⁴³ The narrative created by ISIS recruiters and propagandists is one of victimology—on the part Muslims—and potential adherents, followed by redemption through jihadi heroics. The perennial losers are not at fault for being outcasts and suffering rejection, nor are they victims of Western persecution. Instead, as described by Stern and Berger, societal underachievers or outcasts are redeemed by the “simplification of life and thought. Good and evil are brought out in stark relief. A person living a meaningless life is transformed through action.”²⁴⁴ Thus, radicalization offers religious redemption and significance to those leading lives of insignificance.²⁴⁵ Martha Crenshaw summarizes the concept:

Clearly the act is not just about dying and killing. The expectation of gaining status and respect as a martyr for the cause is important, so that individual action is linked to anticipation of both popular approval and collective political success. ... Sacrifice for the cause is both personally redemptive and a mark of honor, a way of becoming a hero and part of an exalted elite, as much as a way of seeking death. It involves an aspiration to live on after death and to give lasting meaning to an otherwise insignificant or disappointing life.²⁴⁶

²⁴² Maxwell Taylor and Helen Ryan, “Fanaticism, Political Suicide and Terrorism,” *Terrorism* 11, no. 2 (1988): 91–111, doi: 10.1080/10576108808435703.

²⁴³ Ibid., citing Hafez, “Dying to be Martyrs.”

²⁴⁴ Stern and Berger, “ISIS,” 350.

²⁴⁵ Arie W. Kruglanski et al., “Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance,” *Political Psychology* 30, no. 3 (May 2009): 331–357, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00698.x.

²⁴⁶ Crenshaw, “Explaining Suicide Terrorism.”

While the motivations of ISIS and its precursor al Qaeda may be based on a distorted interpretation of Islam, the motivations of radicalized Westerners may be very different. For the terrorist organization, an attacker willing to risk—if not desiring—death offers the strategic advantage of increased efficacy, lethality, and terror. For the person who struggles—who cannot read social queues or adapt to social norms—ISIS offers the comfort of a “rigid fundamentalist mentality [that] requires everyone to think and believe exactly as they do, or die.”²⁴⁷ Engaging in violence on behalf of ISIS offers truer significance. Waging a suicidal attack that also kills civilians offers the ultimate religious heroics in this life, followed by a martyr’s fantasy in the next.

E. CONCLUSION

ISIS has successfully used the Internet to target the socially isolated, disaffected, or otherwise vulnerable few seeking meaning; conversely, the U.S. strategy to counter violent extremism essentially presumes everyone is susceptible to radicalization, and the central cause is grievance. ISIS’s recruitment strategy tailors efforts toward social misfits and outsiders who are not religious but who seek a mechanism to establish a social identity. This mechanism in part begins with a connection, followed by increasing attention and establishment of a relationship, followed by increasing sense of instilled importance and the opportunity to appear significant or heroic. In this regard, ISIS’s recruitment strategy strives to answer the quest for significance, even if in the hereafter.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁷ Peter Alan Olsson, *The Cult of Osama: Psychoanalyzing Bin Laden and His Magnetism for Muslim Youths* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), 3.

²⁴⁸ Mark Lilla, “The Politics of God,” *New York Times Magazine*, August 19, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/magazine/19Religion-t.html>.

V. CONCLUSION

During Omar Mateen's Pulse nightclub rampage, he paused his attack to contact a local television station, make a call to 911, post to social media, and pledge allegiance to ISIS. During these calls, he referred to himself as one of the *mujahideen*, an Islamic soldier.

Intuitively, there seems something inextricably malignant—something readily identifiable—in a mass murderer of civilians who pauses from the carnage to check social media. Omar Mateen, like arsonist firefighter John Orr, obsessed over significance conferred by others through praise and adulation. Depending on its degree, this obsession—combined with a lack of empathy—may lead to violence. As Anne Manne characterizes,

Arriving at the more pathological end of the spectrum, we have what the great psychoanalyst Otto Kernberg called “malignant narcissism,” the source of much evil in the world. Disappointed in reality, love turns inward, the self becomes idealised, doted upon, admired and excused. Narcissism becomes deadly when destructive impulses become fused with the conscience and transform lying, manipulation, murder or even terrorism into noble acts. As Freud said, “the ideal motive has often served as a camouflage for the dust of destruction.”²⁴⁹

Eerily similar, Orr and Mateen were both rejected from police jobs yet pretended to be involved with law enforcement. The two men experienced rejection from friends and family and were destined to lead lives of insignificance. Both acted on a malignant narrative that conferred significance at the expense of the lives of others. Both seemed willing to rationalize murder to be admired by others.

Still, the prevalent school of academic thought, which has informed those tasked with detecting radicalized persons, maintains that any person is susceptible to radicalization. As Clark McCauley describes, “The psychology behind terrorist violence is normal psychology, abnormal only in the intensity of the group dynamics that link

²⁴⁹ Anne Manne, *The Life of I: The New Culture of Narcissism* (Victoria, Australia: Melbourne University, 2014).

cause with comrades.”²⁵⁰ According to this theory, terrorists are rational actors acting in support of a group and in response to a grievance. As Fathali Moghaddam explains, however, we must maintain our opposition to terrorism but reposition our worldview to “better understand why terrorists behave the way they do.”²⁵¹ By shifting away from reactive policies that focus on individual terrorists and toward mitigating the causes of the ideology, we prevent “conditions that ultimately give rise to terrorism.”²⁵² Nevertheless, despite the West’s attempt to assuage perceived grievances by reducing its military presence in the lands of the historical caliphate and releasing prisoners from Guantanamo Bay, radicalization has increased.

To understand the behavior, it is incredibly important to study the criminal narrative—to interview the offender and analyze his claimed reasoning but not to conflate the offender’s narrative with reality.²⁵³ For instance, John Orr claimed to have had an idyllic childhood even though his mother abandoned him when he was a teenager. Anders Breivik, the right-wing terrorist who murdered seventy-seven and injured 319, claimed to be popular and outgoing when in reality he was a shy loner.²⁵⁴ Omar Mateen was obsessed with becoming a police officer and posted photos of himself wearing NYPD shirts on social media; yet he was repeatedly rejected from law enforcement employment.²⁵⁵

In contrast to the top-down approaches, Hafez and Mullins’s “radicalization puzzle” synthesizes “factors that come together to produce violent radicalization: personal and collective grievances, networks and interpersonal ties, political and religious ideologies, and enabling environments and support structures.”²⁵⁶ The puzzle metaphor

²⁵⁰ Bonger et al., *Psychology of Terrorism*, 20.

²⁵¹ Moghaddam, *Terrorist’s Point of View*, 2.

²⁵² Ibid., 128.

²⁵³ Pressor, “Criminology and the Narrative Turn”; Sandberg, “Self-narratives.”

²⁵⁴ Sandberg, “Self-narratives.”

²⁵⁵ Swisher, “Omar Mateen.”

²⁵⁶ Hafez and Mullins, *The Radicalization Puzzle*.

seems far more apt a construct to explain the perplexing phenomenon of a seemingly normal person becoming a violent radical.

In the appropriately titled article, “Terrorism—A (Self) Love Story,” Arie Kruglanski et al. reassert the importance of individual motivations through self-love and the quest for significance in understanding the mystery of radicalization.²⁵⁷ They argue self-love fuels an individual’s need to be significant in the eyes of others. In the broadest sense, this thesis has sought to separate the strategic motivations of an organization from the motivations of the individual. To do so, the research has emphasized the individual to demystify radicalization. Specifically, this thesis looked to the seemingly unrelated phenomena of arson by firefighter and Westerner radicalization.

Finding an appropriate strategy for detecting both arson by firefighter and radicalization is like finding a needle in a haystack.²⁵⁸ However, in the case of arson by firefighter, the needle was found by objectively analyzing offenders. This thesis attempted to take the known root causes of arson by firefighter and apply them to the unknown root causes of Westerner radicalization. A very small percentage of firefighters set fires to appear heroic as a mechanism to establish an identity and sense of belonging. Disconnected Westerners similarly radicalize to fulfill a narrative of belonging and significance. To know and understand ISIS, the United States and its allies need to do more than simply interview captured adherents for their accounts; instead, they need to closely analyze their actions and methodology for recruiting and inspiring Westerners. Additionally, the focus on mitigating perceived grievances undervalues the hero complex and related motivations.

Much like radicalization today, the arson-by-firefighter problem in the late 1980s and early 1990s seemed an uncontrolled epidemic. The real question in both phenomena is what differentiates that tiny fraction who become firefighter arsonists or radicals from everyone else. First, contrary to prior theory, this thesis finds that typical firefighter

²⁵⁷ Kruglanski et al., “A (Self) Love Story.”

²⁵⁸ James B. Comey, “Update on Orlando Terrorism Investigation,” press conference remarks, FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC, June 13, 2016, <https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/update-on-orlando-terrorism-investigation>.

arsonists are not pyromaniacs or “arsonists turned firefighters.”²⁵⁹ Instead, firefighter arsonists set fires seeking heroic status by being the first on scene to save a life. Moreover, the research suggests they possess something more than the simple desire to appear heroic; this drive serves as a mechanism to establish a social identity within a culturally admirable group. In Western culture, firefighters are admired because they bravely risk their lives to save people and property. To a person living a life of familial or societal rejection, as revealed within the firefighter arsonist profiles, this admiration and popularity offers significance. However, not everyone is brave or heroic enough to be a firefighter; an individual must prove himself worthy. At its essence, fire-setting is a means to an end—to establish an identity.

The offender profiles developed separately by the FBI and researchers from South Carolina provide significant clues to understanding what separated that small number of arsonists from every other young firefighter. Typically, the offenders studied had dysfunctional childhoods and unstable relationships as young adults, with the associated lack of social and interpersonal skills. They also possessed poor occupational histories, which often involved menial, low-wage jobs. Many of the offenders also experienced isolation, alcoholism, depression, or other psychosocial disorders. Cumulatively, the profiles depict persons who were shunned by family and society. They were unable to conform to what society expected of them, such as maintaining stable, meaningful employment and relationships. They sought to change their social identities and reinvent themselves through heroic acts, even if it meant manufacturing crises. However, there exists something inherently malignant in these narratives; the offenders willingly risked the lives of others to portray themselves as selfless and heroic.

Within a distinct but nonetheless parallel narrative, terrorist leaders and recruiters provide a mechanism to establish meaning and significance to the insignificant. ISIS uses the Internet to target the socially isolated, disaffected, and otherwise vulnerable few seeking meaning. This strategy is tailored toward social misfits and outsiders who are not

²⁵⁹ Hinds-Aldrich, “Firesetting Firefighters.”

religious by providing a social identity.²⁶⁰ In this regard, ISIS's recruitment strategy offers the dejected a path toward significance.²⁶¹

Analysts or officers who are tasked with detecting radicalized and/or violent persons should study the characteristics found in arsonist firefighters as well as those targeted by ISIS. They should also look for individuals who are highly reactive to criticism or contrary viewpoints, exhibit poor interpersonal boundaries, or display grandiosity.²⁶² Similarly, their training should incorporate research into the dark triad—the personality traits of narcissism, psychopathology, and Machiavellianism.²⁶³ While the existence of one or more of these characteristics alone is not dispositive, it is relevant. However, when these factors suggest mental illness and the individual also embraces the ISIS narrative (e.g., the possession of beheading videos), it should be cause for great concern. It is critically important for those suspected of radicalization not to be categorized solely as either terrorists or mental health patients; they may, indeed, be both. Collaboration between mental health professionals and joint terrorism task forces should be considered.

A. COUNTERING A MALIGNANT NARRATIVE OF SIGNIFICANCE

In South Carolina, the arson-by-firefighter problem increased significantly in the early 1990s (forty-seven cases in 1994) but then dropped off dramatically (thirty in 1995 and only three in 1996) after the implementation of a screening and awareness training program.²⁶⁴ “Hero to Zero” in Pennsylvania and “Secrets in the Firehouse” in Louisiana reflect the best practices to prevent arson by firefighter.²⁶⁵ Aggressive prosecutions and these highly successful programs—which push a strong counter-narrative to young, impressionable firefighters about the very real consequences of arson—have turned the

²⁶⁰ “Casey by Case,” Center on National Security at Fordham Law.

²⁶¹ Lilla, “The Politics of God.”

²⁶² Seltzer, “6 Signs of Narcissism.”

²⁶³ Paulhus, and Williams, “The Dark Triad.”

²⁶⁴ U.S. Fire Administration, *Firefighter Arson*, 3

²⁶⁵ Christopher E. Allen, “What Are the Best Practices for Preventing, Identifying and Investigating Arson by Firefighters?” *Forensics Journal* 5 (2014): 31–36.

tide on the epidemic. These programs focus on shame, both to the fire-starter and to any firefighter who has reason to suspect another but says nothing. The programs acknowledge the motivations underlying the hero complex and seek to convince young firefighters that arson is not the way to achieve significance.

The most significant catalysts for ISIS recruitment and inspiration have been the caliphate declaration, which legitimized the group, and significant battlefield successes, which have reinforced the fantasy of jihadist heroism. Arguably, the Western exodus from Iraq that precipitated these successes further bolstered the legitimacy of the jihadi narrative, which preaches that the West has grown increasingly weak. A central strategic component to countering violent extremism must be recognizing that what happens *there*, may have a profound impact on what occurs *here*. As the West has re-engaged in Iraq and Syria with an increased presence and significantly enhanced kinetic action, ISIS recruitment has decreased.²⁶⁶ Despite this apparent trend, *inspiration* seems to have increased—as seen in Omar Mateen’s attack at the Pulse nightclub.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The consensus view on countering violent extremism that dismisses psychoanalytical or psychological approaches must be reevaluated. The human mind is not a light switch that flips evenly between normal and abnormal.²⁶⁷ Research establishes that personality traits, including the dark triad—narcissism, psychopathology, and Machiavellianism—do affect human behavior.²⁶⁸ The expert consensus has relied far too much on what captured or disaffected terrorists have chosen to reveal and not enough on what their recruitment behavior can teach us. Similarly, as the U.S.-led coalition battling ISIS became more militarily aggressive in late 2015, recruitment decreased as well. Ultimately, we need to ensure those tasked with identifying radicals realize that not everyone is susceptible to radicalization. Instead, they need to look for indications of the

²⁶⁶ Witte, Raghaven, and McAuley, “Flow of Foreign Fighters.”

²⁶⁷ Emily Corner, Paul Gill, and Oliver Mason, “Mental Health Disorders and the Terrorist: A Research Note Probing Selection Effects and Disorder Prevalence,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 39, no. 6 (2016).

²⁶⁸ Paulhus and Williams, “The Dark Triad.”

individual's quest for significance and the trait of narcissism. A potential radical may be both a terrorist and mentally ill. Although we do not have a full grasp on what causes Westerner radicalization, depriving radicals of the appearance of success on the battlefield, delegitimizing ISIS in the eyes of potential recruits and aspirants, and otherwise eliminating ISIS as a potential mechanism for achieving desired significance could all be useful steps to help reduce Western radicalization.

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**APPENDIX A. OMAR MATEEN'S CONVERSATIONS WITH
POLICE DURING PULSE NIGHTCLUB SHOOTING²⁶⁹**

1

1 Sunday June 12th, 2016. The time 2:35 a.m.

2 911 OPERATOR: 911. This call is being

3 recorded.

4 SUSPECT: This is Mateen (speaking in

13:16:27 5 another language). I want to let you know I'm in

6 Orlando and I did the shooting.

7 911 OPERATOR: What's your name?

8 SUSPECT: My name is I Pledge of Allegiance

9 to (unidentifiable name) of the Islamic State.

13:16:47 10 911 OPERATOR: Okay. What's your name?

11 SUSPECT: I pledge my allegiance to

12 (unidentifiable name) on behalf of the Islamic

13 State.

14 911 OPERATOR: Where are you at?

13:17:00 15 SUSPECT: In Orlando.

16 911 OPERATOR: Where in Orlando?

17 (End)

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²⁶⁹ "Pulse Tragedy Public Records," City of Orlando, accessed March 16, 2017, <http://www.cityoforlando.net/cityclerk/pulse-tragedy-public-records/>.

1 NEGOTIATION 1 Sunday June 12, 2016. The time 2:48 a.m.
2 NEGOTIATOR: 0247.
3 SUSPECT: Hello.
4 NEGOTIATOR: Hello, there. Hi there, there
13:29:26 5 is Orlando Police. Who am I speaking with,
6 please?
7 SUSPECT: You're speaking to the person who
8 pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of
9 (unidentified name).
13:29:38 10 NEGOTIATOR: Can you tell me where you are
11 right now so I can you get some help?
12 SUSPECT: No. Because you have to tell
13 America to stop bombing Syria and Iraq. They are
14 killing a lot of innocent people. What am I to do
13:29:52 15 here when my people are getting killed over there.
16 You get what I'm saying?
17 NEGOTIATOR: I do. I completely get what
18 you're saying. What I'm trying to do is prevent
19 anybody else from getting --
13:30:00 20 SUSPECT: You need to stop the U.S. air
21 strikes. They need to stop the U.S. air strikes,
22 okay?
23 NEGOTIATOR: I understand.
24 SUSPECT: They need to stop the U.S. air
13:30:08 25 strikes. You have to tell the U.S. government to

1 stop bombing. They are killing too many children,
2 they are killing too many women, okay?

3 NEGOTIATOR: I understand that. Here is
4 why I'm here right now. I'm with the Orlando
13:30:19 5 police. Can you tell me what you know about
6 what's going on tonight?

7 SUSPECT: What's going on is that I feel
8 the pain of the people getting killed in Syria and
9 Iraq and all over the Muslim (unidentified word).

13:30:35 10 NEGOTIATOR: Okay. So have you done
11 something about that?

12 SUSPECT: Yes, I have.

13 NEGOTIATOR: Tell me what you did, please.

14 SUSPECT: You already know what I did.

13:30:47 15 NEGOTIATOR: Look, I'm trying to figure out
16 how to keep you safe and how to get this resolved
17 peacefully because I'm not a politician, I'm not a
18 government. All I can do is help individuals and
19 I want to start with helping you.

13:31:01 20 SUSPECT: By the way, there is some
21 vehicles outside that have some bombs just to let
22 you know. Your people are going to get it and I'm
23 going to ignite it if they try to do anything
24 stupid.

13:31:13 25 NEGOTIATOR: Okay. I understand that and

1 I'll pass that along. Can you tell me what
2 vehicle? Because I don't want to see anybody get
3 hurt.

4 SUSPECT: No. But I'll tell you this, they
13:31:25 5 can take out a whole city block almost.

6 NEGOTIATOR: I understand that. Tell me,
7 in the club do you have any injured people with
8 you that you brought with you?

9 SUSPECT: I'm not -- I'm not letting you
13:31:38 10 know nothing.

11 NEGOTIATOR: I'm trying to offer you help.

12 SUSPECT: Well, you need to know that they
13 need to stop bombing Syria and Iraq. The U.S. is
14 collaborating with Russia and they are killing
13:31:49 15 innocent women and children, okay?

16 NEGOTIATOR: I hear what you're saying.

17 SUSPECT: My homeboy Tamerlan Tsarnaev did
18 his thing on the Boston Marathon, my homeboy
19 (unidentified name) did his thing, okay, so now
13:32:02 20 it's my turn, okay?

21 NEGOTIATOR: Okay. Let's start. My name
22 is Andy. What's yours?

23 SUSPECT: My name is Islamic soldier, okay?

24 NEGOTIATOR: Okay. What can I call you?

13:32:17 25 SUSPECT: Call me Mujahideen, call me the

1 Soldier of the God.

2 NEGOTIATOR: Okay. Okay. So that's a lot
3 for me to say, so can I just -- can I just call
4 you something else? Do you have a name, a
13:32:31 5 nickname?

6 SUSPECT: Just to let you know --

7 NEGOTIATOR: I'm here. I'm listening. I'm
8 here, I'm listening.

9 SUSPECT: It's the last month of the
13:32:50 10 Ramadan if you ever know about that.

11 NEGOTIATOR: Yes, I do. I understand.

12 SUSPECT: I fasted the whole day today. I
13 fasted the whole day and I prayed.

14 NEGOTIATOR: I understand that. Okay.

13:32:58 15 What I'm trying to do is make sure that you and no
16 one else suffers any further injury, okay? I can
17 help you.

18 SUSPECT: I have a vest.

19 NEGOTIATOR: Okay. You have a vest. I
13:33:10 20 understand that. Okay. And so what kind of vest
21 are you talking about? Is it a bullet-resistant
22 vest? Is it a bomb vest?

23 SUSPECT: No. It's what they used in
24 France.

13:33:25 25 NEGOTIATOR: It's what they used in France.

1 SUSPECT: I got to go.

2 NEGOTIATOR: Well, I'd like you to stay on
3 the phone with me please, okay? Are you there?
4 Please stay on the phone with me so I can help
13:33:38 5 pass along your concerns.

6 SUSPECT: If you bring the bomb dog they
7 are not going to smell shit.

8 NEGOTIATOR: Well, I understand that.

9 SUSPECT: You can't smell it. Bring your
13:33:52 10 little American bomb dog, they are fucking
11 outdated anyway.

12 NEGOTIATOR: Well, tell me, I presume from
13 what you're saying you're wearing a bomb vest?

14 SUSPECT: No.

13:34:02 15 NEGOTIATOR: Well, you said you're wearing
16 a vest.

17 SUSPECT: No, I'm not.

18 NEGOTIATOR: So what are you wearing?

19 SUSPECT: Yeah, like, you know, to go out
13:34:08 20 to go out to a wedding.

21 NEGOTIATOR: Okay. I'm not trying to joke
22 with you, I'm trying to be serious and get this
23 peacefully resolved. Okay? So are you wearing a
24 bomb vest?

13:34:26 25 Okay. What can I call you? Let's go back

1 to that. Let start with that. Okay. I
2 understand you're a soldier, I understand you're
3 an Isis, I understand you're Mujahideen and you
4 pledge your allegiance to someone whose name I
13:34:40 5 can't pronounce. I apologize for that, okay? Can
6 you start with that? Are you an American citizen?
7 Are you a local citizen? Are you a resident of
8 Orlando?

9 Hello? Are you there? I'm right here.
13:35:02 10 You need to talk to me. You have to talk to me.
11 I'm still here. Are you there? Talk to me
12 please. Are you there? Sir, are you there? We
13 need to talk. We need to try to resolve this
14 peacefully. I don't want to see you or anybody
13:35:42 15 else get injured. Please help us.

16 So you say there's a vehicle outside with a
17 bomb. Is there more than one vehicle? Are there
18 other shooters? Tell me what's going on, please.
19 Tell me what's going on. I'm here. I'm
13:36:13 20 listening. I'm here, I'm listening.

21 * * * * *
22 Sunday June 12, 2016, the time 2:56 a.m.
23 NEGOTIATOR: I'm still here. I'm trying to
24 help you. Okay? I need some help from you. We
13:36:40 25 need to get this resolved peacefully. And we need

1 your help to do that. I know you want to get this
2 resolved peacefully.

3 I'm listening, but you need to talk to me.
4 I need you to talk to me. This is a serious
13:37:13 5 matter and I want to take it seriously and I want
6 to listen to what you have to say, but I can't do
7 that if it's a one-sided conversation. Are you
8 there? (End)

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1 NEGOTIATION 2

2 NEGOTIATOR: Hello.

3 SUSPECT: Hello.

4 NEGOTIATOR: Hi there, there is Orlando

14:03:46 5 Police calling you back.

6 SUSPECT: (Inaudible)

7 NEGOTIATOR: I'm sorry, again, my name is

8 Andy, what's yours?

9 SUSPECT: Andy.

14:03:56 10 NEGOTIATOR: Okay. Tell me what's going on

11 there right now, because I'm not there. I'm

12 trying to help you. Okay? I'm trying to help

13 you. Tell me what's going on right now. I don't

14 want to see anybody get injured including you.

14:04:13 15 So let's start. Are you injured? Sir, are

16 you injured? I'm trying to help you. I don't

17 want to see this go further. Please let us

18 peacefully resolve it with your assistance. Can

19 you hear me? Can you hear me?

14:04:42 20 Hello? Can you hear me? This is Andy from

21 Orlando Police. Are you there?

22 * * * * *

23 (Ringing) Please leave your message for 772 --

24 (Ringing) Please leave your message for 77 --

14:06:49 25 (Ringing) Please leave your message for 7 --

1 (Ringing) Please leave your message--
2 (Ringing).
3 SUSPECT: Hello.
4 NEGOTIATOR: Hello, Omar. This is Andy
14:08:42 5 from Orlando Police.
6 SUSPECT: Mm-hmm.
7 NEGOTIATOR: Tell me what's going on right
8 now, Omar.
9 SUSPECT: Yo, the air strike that killed
14:08:51 10 Abu Wahid a few weeks ago --
11 NEGOTIATOR: Okay.
12 TROUSPECT: That's what triggered it, okay?
13 NEGOTIATOR: Okay.
14 SUSPECT: They should have not bombed and
14:08:58 15 killed Abu Wahid.
16 NEGOTIATOR: I understand.
17 SUSPECT: Do your fucking homework and
18 figure out who Abu Wahid is, okay?
19 NEGOTIATOR: I understand that. What I
14:09:04 20 need to find out is are you injured? Omar?
21 SUSPECT: That's none of your business.
22 NEGOTIATOR: Well, I understand that, but
23 if you're injured I want to get you some help.
24 SUSPECT: No.
14:09:15 25 NEGOTIATOR: Okay. Do you have somebody

1 with you?

2 SUSPECT: That's none of your business.

3 NEGOTIATOR: Okay. Tell me what you want
4 me to pass along. Because I can't sit here and do
14:09:26 5 research. I want to pass along "Tell them to stop
6 bombing in Syria."

7 SUSPECT: Yes. The air strikes need to
8 stop and stop collaborating with Russia. Okay?

9 NEGOTIATOR: Okay. I can pass that along.

14:09:36 10 SUSPECT: And let it be known, let it be
11 known in the next few days you're going to see
12 more of this type of action going on, okay?

13 NEGOTIATOR: Okay. I understand that. I
14 can pass that along. Where is that going to
14:09:49 15 happen?

16 SUSPECT: It's none of your business. Just
17 let it be known it's going to be done in the name
18 of the Islamic State, even though it's not fucking
19 air strikes, it's fucking strikes here, okay?

14:10:03 20 NEGOTIATOR: I understand that. I
21 understand that. So tell me what happened
22 tonight? How did this go down for you?

23 SUSPECT: This went down, a lot of innocent
24 women and children are getting killed in Syria and
14:10:21 25 Iraq and Afghanistan, okay?

1 NEGOTIATOR: I understand that. You're
2 upset about the bombing in Syria and Afghanistan
3 and you want the bombing and the killing to stop.
4 I understand your concern. I share that concern.
14:10:32 5 I want to pass your message along. Tell me what
6 else you'd like me to pass along, please.

7 SUSPECT: To stop, tell them to stop.

8 NEGOTIATOR: I will do that. I will do
9 that. So can you tell me how we can peacefully
14:10:52 10 resolve this tonight? I'd like to see you come
11 out, I'd like to talk to you some more.

12 SUSPECT: Tell -- tell the fucking -- the
13 air strikes need to stop.

14 NEGOTIATOR: I'm doing that. I'm passing
14:11:05 15 that message along, immediately.

16 SUSPECT: You see, now you feel, now you
17 feel how it is, now you feel how it is.

18 NEGOTIATOR: I understand your concern,
19 Omar. Do you have somebody that you brought with
14:11:24 20 you that we need to check on and make sure they
21 are not injured?

22 SUSPECT: No. No. No. No. No. No,
23 Mr. Hostage Negotiator, don't try your bullshit
24 with me.

14:11:35 25 NEGOTIATOR: Well, I'm trying to help you.

1 And you don't want people to get injured, I
2 presume that means if you brought somebody with
3 you, you don't want them hurt. Is that correct?

4 SUSPECT: None of your business, homeboy.

14:11:48 5 NEGOTIATOR: Okay. Omar, can I get you to
6 come outside and talk to my people there at the
7 scene so we can peacefully resolve this?

8 SUSPECT: No.

9 NEGOTIATOR: Okay. Because I'm not there,
14:11:59 10 but I have people there that would love to talk to
11 you. Can you put down your weapon and come down
12 outside and talk to them, please?

13 SUSPECT: You want to know what type of
14 weapon I have too?

14:12:12 15 NEGOTIATOR: If you want to tell me.

16 SUSPECT: Or you want to know how many
17 weapons I have?

18 NEGOTIATOR: I can take that too. I'm all
19 ears, Omar. I have no agenda other than to help
14:12:22 20 you pass along this message.

21 SUSPECT: So what year -- so what year did
22 you graduate from the police academy?

23 NEGOTIATOR: I'm sorry?

24 SUSPECT: What year did you graduate from
14:12:32 25 the police academy?

1 NEGOTIATOR: Sir, this is about you, okay?
2 I'm here to help you. I'm here to pass along your
3 information. Okay? You don't want to know
4 ancient history about me. Tell me how I can help
14:12:44 5 you.

6 You asked me do I want to know about
7 weapons? Sure, tell me about your weapons. Omar?
8 I'm trying to help you. I can't do that if you
9 won't give me something to pass along to the
14:13:03 10 people that are in power which is I presume what
11 you want to happen out of all of this. I don't
12 want to see you or any of your associates get
13 hurt, I don't want to see anybody else get hurt
14 in the United States or anywhere else around the
14:13:15 15 world. So tell me how you and I can work together
16 to get this peacefully resolved now.

17 Omar? Omar, you get to talk to me. Omar?
18 Listen to me, I don't want to see you get injured.
19 Omar, can you hear me?

14:13:56 20 Are you there? Omar? You and I have to
21 talk. We have to work together. Omar, I need to
22 pass along what your concerns are. Omar?

23 (Ringing) I got 0315. Please leave your
24 message for --

14:15:17 25 (Ringing) Please leave your message for --

1 NEGOTIATOR: Ringing, 0316. One ring.

2 SUSPECT: Hello?

3 NEGOTIATOR: Omar? Listen, this is Andy
4 from the police again. I don't want to mess up
14:16:02 5 your message. You come out and you can tell it
6 yourself. I'll arrange media or whatever you
7 want. It's got to be a first step.

8 SUSPECT: Look, you're annoying me with a
9 lot of your phone calls. I call you (inaudible).

14:16:21 10 NEGOTIATOR: Well, I understand that, but
11 obviously, you know, it's my job, I need to be in
12 contact with you. I'm your communication lifeline
13 to everyone that's outside. I'm trying to pass
14 along your message and I don't want to screw that
14:16:34 15 message up.

16 You tell me you don't want people to get
17 hurt, I presume that includes you. Tell me your
18 message and I will pass that along. You don't
19 want the bombings. Tell me about it. I'll write
14:16:51 20 it down.

21 Omar? Omar, please talk to me. I want to
22 get your message out. I want to pass along what
23 you have to say. I can't do that if you won't
24 talk to me.

14:17:09 25 (End)

1 NEGOTIATION 3

2 (Ringing) .

3 NEGOTIATOR: Omar.

4 SUSPECT: Yeah?

14:46:44 5 NEGOTIATOR: What's going on? I couldn't
6 get ahold of you for a while.

7 SUSPECT: You're annoying me with these
8 phone calls and I don't really appreciate it.

9 NEGOTIATOR: Well, I understand that, but
14:46:54 10 the fact that you appreciate it or not doesn't
11 matter at this point. We need to talk and we need
12 to stay --

13 SUSPECT: Don't say things likes that, no.
14 No. No. No. No. No. No.

14:47:02 15 NEGOTIATOR: No, I'm treating you like an
16 adult. We need to stay in constant contact.

17 SUSPECT: No. No. No. No. No. No. No.

18 NEGOTIATOR: Tell me what's going on now,
19 Omar?

14:47:12 20 SUSPECT: What's going on is that the air
21 strikes need to stop.

22 NEGOTIATOR: Yes.

23 SUSPECT: They need to stop.

24 NEGOTIATOR: The air strikes need to stop.

14:47:19 25 SUSPECT: They need to stop killing people.

1 NEGOTIATOR: I've heard that and I want you
2 to come outside and tell us that yourself so the
3 message rings true from you without me passing
4 along your message. I'm doing that, but I need
14:47:33 5 you to come outside with no weapons.

6 Omar? Hang up, 3:25.

7 (Ringing). (End)
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APPENDIX B. ARREST RECORD OF SHAHLA MATEEN, MOTHER OF OMAR MATEEN²⁷⁰

02mm15172

COURT DOCKET NO. _____

USE SEPARATE FORMS FOR EACH DEFENDANT AND FOR MULTIPLE OFFENSES OCCURRING AT DIFFERENT TIME, DATE OR LOCATION

ARREST AFFIDAVIT

1. ☐ Fingerprinted ☐ By ☐ AFIS ☐ TRUE ☐ FALSE

2. ☐ Identification Only ☐ Criminal

BOOKING OFFICER: Fleming JAIL NUMBER: 857803

LOCAL CASE NO.: 02-16879 DATE OF BIRTH: 1/12/59

DEFENDANT NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE): MATEEN SHAHLA

AKA: _____

PERMANENT ADDRESS (STREET NO. STREET NAME CITY) PHONE: _____

STATE: FL ZIP CODE: _____ CITY: _____

DEFENDANT REQUIRED TO APPEAR IN COUNTY COURT

ON: _____

AT: _____ AM PM

DEFENDANT REQUIRED TO APPEAR IN COUNTY COURT

ON: Jan 9 2003 AM PM

AT: 830 AM PM

ARREST DATA: DATE: 12/1/02 MILITARY TIME: 0135 SECTOR: 1 STREET: _____ STATE: FL CITY: 41412

OFFENSE DATA: DATE: 12/1/02 MILITARY TIME: 0010 SECTOR: 1 STREET: _____ STATE: FL CITY: 41412

Weapons Seized/Type: _____

Residence Type: _____

Charge Status: ☒ PC ☐ CAPAS ☐ BW ☐ PW ☐ JUV ☐ PU ☐ CITATION

Indication of: ☐ Alcohol Intoxication ☐ Drug Intoxication

Charge/Statute No.: _____

IF DRUGS: _____

| SEQ. NO. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | ACTIVITY | TYPE |
|----------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|------|
| 1. | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | Domestic Battery 874.03 | |
| 2. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
| 3. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
| 4. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
| 5. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |
| 6. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | | |

CLERK COURT COPY: _____

PRINCIPAL ARRESTING OFFICER / AGENCY (PRINT): Ys B. Garland

OFFICER'S NO.: 413/1105

SCHOLARSHIP / BURETY NAME: _____

CO-DEFENDANT'S (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE): _____

VICTIM'S NAME: SEDDIQUE MATEEN

SUMMARY OF OFFENSES AND PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT

The above named defendant was arrested for the following reasons:

PROBABLE CAUSE

I WAS DISPATCHED REFERENCE A DOMESTIC DISPUTE. VICTIM
SEDDIQUE MATEEN TOLD ME THAT BOTH HIS WIFE AND
HE HAD BEEN ARGUING AND WHEN HE WENT
TO BRUSH HIS TEETH HIS WIFE THE ABOVE DEFENDANT
STARTED CURSING AT HIM AND PULLED HIS HAIR ALONG
WITH PINCHING HIS LEFT BICEP. THE VICTIM SEDDIQUE
HAD A VISIBLE RED MARK ON HIS LEFT BICEP CONSISTANT
WITH BEING PINCHED. SEDDIQUE TOLD ME THAT HE
AND THE ABOVE DEFENDANT HAVE BEEN MARRIED

The preceding is true to the best of my present knowledge or belief.

Signature: Ys B. Garland Sworn & Subscribed before me this 7 day of DEC, 2002

NOTARY / ASA: Ys B. Garland

²⁷⁰ Arrest report for Shahle Matten, January 9, 2003, released by Martin County and first published by Radar Online.

ARREST AFFIDAVIT CONTINUATION

Agency Case No.

02-16879

Arrest Date

12/7/02

Defendant Last Name

MATTEN

FOR 20 YEARS AND HAVE FOUR CHILDREN
TOGETHER WHO WERE IN THE HOUSE ASLEEP DURING
THE INCIDENT. THE ABOVE DEFENDANT WAS
ARRESTED AND TRANSPORTED TO THE MARTIN
COUNTY JAIL WITH OUT INCIDENT TO BE
PROCESSED.

2002 DEC 9 AM 11:06
CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT
JANISIA ENRIQUE
FOR RECORD
JAN 10 2003

The preceding is true to the best of my present knowledge or belief.

Signature

1/5 B. Gall 413
Garland

Sworn & Subscribed before me this

7

day of

DEC 2002

NOTARY / ASA

mcl

My Commission expires

TEEM

Agency

mcl

52

() FELONY (X) MISDEMEANOR () EXTRADITION () PROBATION VIOLATION ()

IN THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR MARTIN COUNTY, FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA VS: MATEEN, SHAHLA CASE NO. _____

CHARGE(S): BATTERY (DOMESTIC)

I. DEFENDANT ARRESTED BY MCSO (AGENCY) UPON WARRANT () ; UPON
CAPIAS () ; OTHER (X) ; AND HAVING REVIEWED THE SWORN TESTIMONY AND/OR
AFFIDAVIT(S) ATTACHED HERETO OF GARLAND , THE COURT FINDS:

A. (X) PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT DEFENDANT HAS COMMITTED, AND DEFENDANT
SHALL BE HELD TO ANSWER FOR, THE OFFENSE (S) OF: as charged

B. () NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT DEFENDANT HAS COMMITTED, AND
DEFENDANT SHALL NOT BE HELD TO ANSWER FOR, THE OFFENSE (S) OF:

C. _____

II. BOND SET AT: No Bond \$5000 10/27

DEFENDANT INFORMED AND ADVISED OF:
(X) THE CHARGE. DEFENDANT GIVEN COPY OF COMPLAINT.
(X) HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, THAT ANYTHING HE SAYS MAY BE USED AGAINST HIM.
(X) HIS RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE WITH COUNSEL/FAMILY/FRIENDS.
(X) HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. PUBLIC DEFENDER APPOINTED: YES _____ NO X

III. PRELIMINARY HEARING SET: _____

BOUND OVER TO: County COURT RETURNABLE: next plea day

IV. DEFENDANT PLEAS: _____ ADJUDICATION: _____

SENTENCED TO: _____

V. ORDERED: _____

DATE: 12/7/02

[Signature]
JUDGE

FILED FOR RECORD
MARTIN CO. FL
2002 DEC -9 AM 11:06
MARSHA EWING
CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR MARTIN COUNTY, FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA)

-VS-)

Shahla Mateen)

Defendant)

Case No. 02-5172-MMA

NO INFORMATION

COMES NOW the State of Florida, by and through its undersigned State Attorney, and files this NO INFORMATION in the above-styled cause wherein the Defendant is charged with :

BATTERY, M-1, 784.03,

Dated January 3rd 2003.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
BRUCE H. COLTON, State Attorney

BY: Kathleen H. Roberts
Kathleen Roberts
Assistant State Attorney
Florida Bar Number 983500
100 E. Ocean Blvd., Suite 400
Stuart, FL 34994
(772) 288-5646

2003 JAN -3 PM 8:27
FOR RECORD
CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT

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